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SHAKING THE FOUNDATION OF GIDEON:
A CRITIQUE OF NICHOLS IN OVERRULING
BALDASAR V ILLINOIS
Ralph Ruebner*
JenniferBerner**
Anne Herbert'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Among the guarantees provided by the Sixth Amendment is the
right of an accused person to have the assistance of counsel in preparing
and presenting a defense This safeguard serves to protect the fundamental right of the accused to a fair trial. Over the past thirty-six years,
the United States Supreme Court has defined the nature of this right. In
doing so, the Court has fashioned this right to promote the interests of
fairness.2
Significant in this long line of cases is Baldasarv. Illinois,3 where
a majority of the Court held, consistent with prior decisions of the Court,
that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to

* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., University of Illinois, 1966; J.D.,
American University, Washington College of Law, 1969. The Author assisted in drafting Petitioner's
Brief to the Supreme Court in Baldosarv. Illinois.
** Associate, Quinlan & Crisham, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Northwestern University,
1992; J.D., summa cum laude, The John Marshall Law School, 1995.
*** Clerk to the Honorable Thomas R. Rakowski, Justice of the Illinois Appellate Court, First
District. B.G.S., University of Michigan, 1986; J.D., cum laude, The John Marshall Law School
1993.
The Authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Mr. Jeremy Sitcoff,
senior law student at The John Marshall Law School and Editor-in-Chief of The John Marshall Law
Review.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that states must
appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants).
3. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruledby Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921
(1994).
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convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony and bring about
incarceration.' The Supreme Court overruled Baldasar in Nichols v.
United States.' The immediate impact of Nichols is that a sentencing
judge is no longer prohibited from enhancing a sentence on the basis of
a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction.6 Obviously, with the
Court's overruling of Baldasar, a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction may now be used to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into
a felony and result in imprisonment.
This Article contends that Nichols is significant for a more
worrisome reason. Nichols harbors an antipathy to the right of counsel
and may have larger implications for the Sixth Amendment. Possibly, it
may be the beginning of a process which challenges the foundation of
Gideon v. Wainwright.7
This Article traces in Part II the history of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, including the decision of the Court in Nichols. In Part I,
the Article then examines why the Court incorrectly decided Nichols and
why the decision did not follow the logical flow of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence leading up to Baldasar.Finally, in Part IV, the Article
addresses why Nichols threatens the reliability of convictions and
sentences and concludes that the Court erred in its decision in Nichols.
II.

RECENT HISTORY OF SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

A.

Cases Leading Up to Baldasar v. Illinois

The United States Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional
requirement of the right to counsel in Powell v. Alabama.' In this case,
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
mandated that indigent defendants receive court-appointed counsel to
help them prepare a meaningful defense.' However, the Court limited its
holding to capital cases, specifically refusing to decide whether the right
10
to counsel extended to indigent defendants accused of lesser crimes.

4. See id. at 225-30.
5. 114 S.Ct. 1921 (1994).
6. See id. at 1928.
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

9. See id. at71.
10. See id. Prior to Powell, numerous jurisdictions afforded defendants the right to court-

appointed counsel in various situations. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5567 (1923) (capital cases); Conley
v. United States, 59 F.2d 929, 936-37 (8th Cir. 1932) (finding no error in not appointing counsel
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In arriving at its decision, the Court placed great emphasis on the specific
circumstances and unique characteristics of the accused, explaining that

they needed counsel due to their youth, ignorance, illiteracy, circumstances of public hostility, and the fact that they were physically far removed
from their family and friends.1 These factors made it particularly likely
that they would not receive a fair trial or a reliable result unless counsel
would help them to understand the nature of the charges, proceedings,
and evidence, and to rebut the evidence against them. 2
The most salient portion of the Court's opinion explained the
importance of the aid of counsel in criminal proceedings. 3 According
to the Court, the right to be heard would be meaningless if it did not
include the right to be heard by counsel.14 The Court explained that

where there is no demand for such counsel); King v. United States, 55 F.2d 1058, 1062 (10th Cir.
1932) (counsel appointed to defend defendant charged with transporting female across state line to
have sex); Miller v. United States, 53 F.2d 316, 317 (7th Cir. 1931) (finding no error in not
appointing counsel where there is no demand for such counsel); Urban v. United States, 46 F.2d 291,
292 (10th Cir. 1931) (counsel appointed for defendant charged with possession and transportation
of whiskey); Downer v. Dunaway, I F. Supp. 1001, 1002 (M.D. Ga. 1932) (counsel appointed in
rape case); Stirling v. State, 297 P. 871, 871 (Ariz. 1931) (bigamy); People v. Farolan, 5 P.2d 893,
893 (Cal. 1931) (murder); People v. Rocco, 285 P. 704,706 (Cal. 1930) (same); Carlson v. People,
15 P.2d 625, 625 (Colo. 1932) (same); Abshier v. People, 289 P. 1081, 1085 (Colo. 1930) (any
criminal case); Cutts v. State, 45 So. 491 (Fla. 1907) (counsel appointed for any felony as a matter
of practice but not required by law); People v. Spino, 183 N.E. 812 (Ill. 1932) (robbery); People v.
Rose, 180 N.E. 791, 792 (Il. 1932) (every criminal defendant); State v. Fountain, 143 So. 55 (La.
1932) (hog stealing); People v. Jury, 233 N.W. 389, 389-90 (Mich. 1930) (murder); People v.
Williams, 195 N.W. 818, 819 (Mich. 1923) (any criminal case); State v. Worden, 56 S.W.2d 595,
596 (Mo. 1932) (rape); Commonwealth v. Flood, 153 A. 152, 153 (Pa. 1930) (murder); State v.
Allen, 82 P. 1036, 1036 (Wash. 1905) (per curiam) (robbery). The Powell Court acknowledged the
right to court-appointed counsel in its opinion:
The United States by statute and every state in the Union by express provision
of law, or by the determination of its courts, make it the duty of the trial judge, where
the accused is unable to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him. In most states the
rule applies broadly to all criminal prosecutions, in others it is limited to the more serious
crimes, and in a very limited number, to capital cases.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 73.
Subsequent to Powell, most cases citing it have done so in reference to the question of
effectiveness of counsel; very few have addressed the issue of when, or if, counsel must be
appointed. See Wilson v. Lanagan, 19 F. Supp. 870, 873 (D. Mass. 1937), aft'd, 99 F.2d 544 (1st
Cir. 1938); Wadsworth v. State, 186 So. 435, 445 (Fla. 1939) (Brown, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Millen, 194 N.E. 463, 471 (Mass. 1935); and People v. La Barbera, 8 N.E.2d 884, 885
(N.Y. 1937), which only noted the holding of Powell. Two states provided for counsel in any
criminal case. See Knox County Council v. State ex reL McCormick, 29 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ind.
1940); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 6 S.E.2d 670, 671 (Va. 1940).
11. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
12. See id. at 71-73.
13. See id. at 69.
14. See id.
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even intelligent and educated persons have difficulty understanding the

law and its application to them. 5 Most individuals, when charged with
a crime, will be unable to determine whether the indictment is proper or
improper because they do not understand the workings of the legal
system.16 As a result, a defendant without counsel suffers the danger of
being put on trial without a proper charge and being convicted upon
incompetent, irrelevant, or inadmissible evidence. t7 A defendant without

15. See id.
16. Indictments may be improper or void for numerous reasons which are not apparent or
detectable to the layperson. An indictment fails when it does not contain sufficient facts to constitute
an offense, see State v. Geary, 239 N.W. 158, 159 (Minn. 1931), and when it does not include all
the elements of the charged offense, see Hagner v. United States, 54 F.2d 446, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1931),
cert. granted,284 U.S. 614, and afd, 285 U.S. 427 (1932); State v. Ritchie, 136 So. 11, 14 (La.
1931). Similarly, where the indictment is not properly presented as defined by a particular criminal
code, see Johnson v. United States, 59 F.2d 42, 43-44 (9th Cir. 1932), is not presented within the
statute of limitations, see Grimsley v. United States, 50 F.2d 509,510 (5th Cir. 1931), or improperly
joins several counts, see Culjak v. United States, 53 F.2d 554, 555-56 (9th Cir. 1931), a defendant
may challenge it. Other examples include an indictment which fails to properly lay jurisdiction, see
Bowles v. United States, 56 F.2d 913, 914 (7th Cir. 1932), or venue, see State v. Myers, 49 S.W.2d
36, 37-40 (Mo. 1932); which is returned based on improper and incompetent evidence, see Marggraf
v. Lewis, 54 F.2d 54, 56-57 (Ist Cir. 1931), or coercion, see People v. Gould, 178 N.E. 133, 148
(Il1. 1931); which contains surplus or prejudicial language that cannot be cured by instructing the
jury, see Beck v. United States, 33 F.2d 107, 114 (8th Cir. 1929), or by a bill of particulars which
would eliminate any prejudicial or untrue charges, see Singer v. United States, 58 F.2d 74, 75-76
(3d Cir. 1932).
Another area defendants may challenge, but may be unaware of the opportunity if
unrepresented by counsel, is where the proof at trial and the averments in the indictment are at
variance. See Morton v. United States, 60 F.2d 696, 697 (7th Cir. 1932); Booth v. United States, 57
F.2d 192, 197 (10th Cir. 1932) (per curiam); People v. Ranney, 1 P.2d 423,427 (Cal. 1931); People
v. Popescue, 177 N.E. 739, 740-41 (Il. 1931).
17. Examples of inadmissible, irrelevant, or incompetent evidence include hearsay evidence
which does not fall within an exception, see United States v. Roberts, 62 F.2d 594, 596 (10th Cir.
1932); Singer v. United States, 58 F.2d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1932); Rivera v. United States, 57 F.2d 816,
820 (1st Cir. 1932); Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 181 N.E. 473, 475 (Mass. 1932); Tatu v. State, 182
N.E. 681, 682-84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1932); evidence obtained after an illegal search or seizure, see
Crank v. United States, 61 F.2d 981, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1932); Kems v. United States, 50 F.2d 602,
602 (6th Cir. 1931); Cooper v. State, 143 So. 217, 218 (Fla. 1932); State v. Innocenti, 16 P.2d 439,
442 (Wash. 1932); testimony subject to a privilege, see Clark v. United States, 61 F.2d 695, 708-09
(8th Cir. 1932), cert. granted,287 U.S. 595, and affd, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); O'Loughlin v. People,
10 P.2d 543, 546 (Colo. 1932); People v. Haab, 245 N.W. 545, 546 (Mich. 1932); evidence of other
crimes defendant committed, see Hood v. United States, 59 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1932); Minner
v. United States, 57 F.2d 506, 510 (10th Cir. 1932); People v. Burkhart, 297 P. 11, 14 (Cal. 1931);
Abbott v. People, 299 P. 1053, 1054 (Colo. 1931), overruled on other groundsby Adrian v. People,
770 P.2d 1243 (Colo. 1989); State v. Flores, 55 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Mo. 1932); Richards v. State, 183
N.E. 36, 39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1932); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 157 S.E. 546, 550 (Va. 1931); character
evidence of defendant, see Davila v. United States, 54 F.2d 356, 356 (1st Cir. 1931); People v. Hill,
241 N.W. 873, 875 (Mich. 1932); State v. Bossart, 241 N.W. 78, 81-82 (N.D. 1932); co-defendant's
statement admissible against him or her but not against other defendants, see Collenger v. United
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counsel may not realize the potential defenses he has." Thus, a
defendant needs the assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceeding against him.19 As stated in Powell, "[w]ithout [counsel], though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence."2 ° The Court explained that if
educated persons were subject to this danger, illiterate or less intelligent
defendants were even more likely to be unfairly convicted.2" Thus, in
forcing defendants to face the dangers of unreliable and unfair verdicts
by refusing to allow them the assistance of counsel, uncounseled
defendants will unquestionably suffer a denial of their due process
rights.'
Six years later, the Supreme Court, applying a Sixth Amendment
analysis in Johnson v. Zerbst,23 unequivocally held that the Constitution
requires the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in federal

States, 50 F.2d 345, 348 (7th Cir. 1931); Garcia v. People, 295 P. 491,492-93 (Colo. 1931); People
v. Gallo, 260 N.Y.S. 32, 34-35 (App. Div. 1932), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. People v. Dolce,
184 N.E. 690 (N.Y. 1933); defendant's involuntary confession, see People v. Dorr, 178 N.E. 476,
1931); State v. Washington, 144 So. 437, 438 (La. 1932); State v. Pierson, 56 S.W.2d
478-79 (Ill.
120, 124 (Mo. 1932); and the character or conduct of a decedent in certain circumstances, see State
v. Oliver, 153 A. 399, 400-01 (N.J. 1931); Commonwealth v. Prophet, 160 A. 597, 601 (Pa. 1932).
18. A few more obvious and known defenses include insanity, see Young v. State, 299 P. 682,
683 (Ariz. 1931); alibi, see People v. Doody, 175 N.E. 436,445 (ILL.1931); self-defense, see Frank
v. United States, 59 F.2d 670, 670 (9th Cir. 1932); Frisina v. United States, 49 F.2d 733, 736 (8th
Cir. 1931); People v. Green, 17 P.2d 730, 733 (Cal. 1932); State v. Jones, 142 So. 693, 695 (La.
1932); State v. Green, 55 S.W.2d 965, 967 (Mo. 1932); voluntary intoxication, see Brennan v.
People, 86 P. 79, 81 (Colo. 1906), superseded by statute COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-804
(1990); involuntary intoxication, see People v. Penman, 110 N.E. 894, 899 (Ill. 1915); defense of
one's habitation or premises, see Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1921); People v.
Doud, 193 N.W. 884, 887 (Mich. 1923); State v. Sorrentino, 224 P. 420,422 (Wyo. 1924); defense
of property, see Commonwealth v. Donahue, 20 N.E. 171, 172 (Mass. 1889); State v. Cleveland, 72
A. 321, 321 (Vt. 1909); Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 36 S.E. 371, 372-73 (Va. 1900); duress,
see State v. Nargashian, 58 A. 953, 954 (R.I. 1904); and mistake, see State v. McCallister, 162 S.E.
484, 485-86 (,V. Va. 1932).
19. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
20. Id.
21. Id. ("If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.").
22. The Court stated:
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear
a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be
doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process
in the constitutional sense.
Id.
23. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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felony prosecutions.2 4 According to the Court, the Sixth Amendment
recognizes that, generally, the criminally accused does not have adequate

legal knowledge and skills to protect his or her interests in life and
liberty in a criminal trial.2 The Court explained that the Sixth Amendment "embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned

counsel." 26 What seems clear and self-evident to an attorney will most
likely be incomprehensible and confusing to a person answering without
counsel.2 7 Thus, according to the Court, indigent defendants must
receive court-appointed counsel to enable them to fairly and fully defend
themselves when accused of a crime.28
Although the Court seemed to broaden the constitutional right to
counsel in Johnson, it limited this right in Betts v. Brady.29 In Betts, the

Court refused to apply the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment." According to the Court,

24. See id. at 462-68. "Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with
crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential
jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty."
Id. at 467.
25. See id. at 462-63.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 463. Some examples include the right to counsel in various aspects of the
prosecution against the criminal defendant, see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 269-74 (1967)
(during a line-up); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223 (1967) (same); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (during interrogation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964)
(same); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 59-60 (1963) (per curiam) (during preliminary hearing);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (on appeal); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471,47576 (1945) (entering a plea); Powell, 287 U.S. at 58 (in capital cases); the right to remain silent, see
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 610 (1965); statute of limitations, see Scott v. State, 566 S.W.2d
737, 740 (Ark. 1978) (in bane); Hall v. Hopper, 216 S.E.2d 839, 840 (Ga. 1975); whether one can
be convicted of multiple charges, see Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851, 854 (4th Cir. 1962);
Clark v. Commonwealth, 115 S.E. 704, 705-06 (Va. 1923), overruled in part by Chittum v.
Commonwealth, 174 S.E.2d 779 (Va. 1970); and the right to a jury trial, see Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
28. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463.
29. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
30. See id. at 471-72. The Court stated:
[I]n the great majority of the States, it has been the considered judgment of the people,
their representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial. On the contrary, the matter has generally been deemed one
of legislative policy. In the light of this evidence, we are unable to say that the concept
of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, whatever
may be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case. Every court has power,
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due process did not require the automatic appointment of counsel in
every state criminal trial, because it was possible for a trial judge to

if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the
interest of fairness.
Id. This statement appears to be somewhat fallacious since at the time of this decision, twenty-five
states provided for appointment of counsel in all criminal cases, sixteen states provided for counsel
in capital or felony cases, two states provided for counsel in capital and non-capital cases, and only
two states denied the right to appointment of counsel in any case, including capital.
Those states which provided appointment of counsel in all cases were: California, see CAL.
PENAL CODE pt. 2, tit. 6, ch. 1, § 987 (Deering 1937); Colorado, see Abshier v. People, 289 P. 1081,
1086 (Colo. 1930); Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6476 (1930); Georgia, see Elam v.
Johnson, 48 Ga. 348, 350 (1873); Idaho, see IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-1412, -1413 (Bobbs-Merrill
1932); Illinois, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 754 (West 1982); Vise v. County of Hamilton, 19 Ill.
78, 79 (1857); Indiana, see Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 29 N.E.2d 405, 407
(Ind. 1940); Iowa, see IOWA CODE § 13773 (1931); Kansas, see 1941 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 291
(expanding on KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1304 (1935), which provided counsel in felony cases
only); Kentucky, see Fugate v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W.2d 47,48 (Ky. 1934); Michigan, see MICH.
COMP. LAWS ch. 287, § 17486 (1929); Montana, see MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 11186 (Tribune
Printing & Supply 1935); Nevada, see NEV. COMP. LAWS § 10883 (1929); New Jersey, see N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2:190-3 (1937); New York, see N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 308 (Thompson's 1939);
North Dakota, see N.D. COMP. LAvs § 8965 (1913); Ohio, see OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 13439-2
(Baldwin 1930); Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1271 (West 1992); Oregon, see OR.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 26-804 (Bancroft-Whitney 1940); South Dakota, see S.D. CODE § 34.1901
(1939) (prior to this time, South Dakota did not provide for appointed counsel in any case, see State
v. Sweeney, 203 N.W. 460, 461 (S.D. 1925)); Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 11734 (1934);
Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 105-22-12 (1943); Virginia, see Watkins v. Commonwealth, 6 S.E.2d
670, 671-72 (Va. 1940); Wisconsin, see Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 249, 250-52 (1859);
Wyoming, see WYO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-501 (1931).
Those states which appointed counsel in capital and/or felony cases included Alabama, see
Campbell v. State, 62 So. 57 (Ala. 1913); Arkansas, see ARK. STAT. ch. 43, § 3877 (Pope's Digest
1937); Florida, see Cutts v. State, 45 So. 491,491-92 (Fla. 1907); Louisiana, see State v. Davis, 131
So. 295,295-96 (La. 1930); Maine, see ME. REV. STAT. ch. 146, § 14 (1930); Maryland, see Coates
v. State, 25 A.2d 676, 679-80 (Md. 1942); Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. ch. 94, § 9957 (1927);
Mississippi, see Reed v. State, 109 So. 715, 715 (Miss. 1926); Nebraska, see NEB. REv. STAT. § 291803 (1964); New Hampshire, see 1926 N.H. LAWS ch. 368, § 1; Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth
ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 24 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 1942); Rhode Island, see State v. Hudson, 179 A. 130,
133-35 (R.I. 1935); South Carolina, see State v. Jones, 173 S.E. 77, 77 (S.C. 1934); Texas, see
Lopez v. State, 80 S.W. 1016, 1017 (Tex. Crim. App. 1904); Vermont, see State v. Gomez, 96 A.
190, 192-93 (Vt. 1915); Washington, see WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 2, § 2305 (Bancroft-Whitney
1932).
Those states which provided appointment in capital or non-capital cases were Arizona, see
AIz. CODE ANN. § 44-904 (Bobbs-Merrill 1939), and Missouri, see MO. REV. STAT. § 4003 (1939).
Those states which denied appointed counsel in any case were Massachusetts, see McDonald
v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (Mass. 1899), aff'd, 180 U.S. 311 (1901), and West Virginia,
see State v. Yoes, 68 S.E. 181, 181 (,V. Va. 1910), overruled in part by State ex rel. Stumbo v.
Boles, 139 S.E.2d 259 (V. Va. 1964).
At the time of the Bill of Rights, Delaware provided for appointed counsel in all capital
cases. See WILLIAm BEANEY, The Right to Counsel, in AMERICAN COURTS 20 (1995).
New Mexico and North Carolina had never addressed the issue at the time of the Betts
decision, and Alaska and Hawaii were not yet states.
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conduct a fair and reliable trial without appointing counsel for an
indigent defendant." In addition, the Court did not wish to "straightjacket" the individual states' interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 Instead, the Court held that the appointment of counsel would
depend on the nature of the case.33

31. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 471-72. This remark was made solely because the defendants in
Maryland usually waived a jury trial and opted for a bench trial. No authority or support was given
by the Court other than a statement from the trial judge who stated: 'Certainly my own experience
in criminal trials over which I have presided (over 2000, as I estimate it), has demonstrated to me
that there are fair trials without counsel employed for the prisoners."' Id. at 472 n.31.
32. See id. at 472.
33. See id. The Court went on to state:
As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and
incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of
fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a
conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment
embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be
fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.
Id. at 473.
Many cases went to the federal courts on habeas corpus grounds. Most, if not all, followed
Betts and refused to appoint counsel unless the case involved a capital offense. See Holly v. Smyth,
294 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1961) (ppr curiam) (refusing to discuss whether capital and non-capital
distinctions of Betts should be repudiated); United States ex rel. Carson v. Wilkins, 292 F.2d 321,
323 (2d Cir. 1961) (burglary, followed Betts); Dick v. Moore, 261 F.2d 233,233 (5th Cir. 1958) (per
curiam) (no counsel need be appointed where defendant was charged with robbery, because Texas
only applied for appointment in capital cases); Henderson v. Bannan, 256 F.2d 363, 382-83 (6th Cir.
1958) (under Michigan law, defendant need not receive appointed counsel when charged with rape);
Wiggins v. Ragen, 238 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1956) (no special circumstances were necessary to
require appointment of counsel in Illinois case for armed robbery); O'Brien v. Lindsey, 204 F.2d
359, 362 (1st Cir. 1953) (no counsel appointed for defendant charged with incest and carnal abuse
of child because not capital offenses); Hanson v. Warden, 198 F.2d 470, 471 (4th Cir. 1952)
(appointment of counsel not necessary for breaking and entry charge). But see Jones v. Cunningham,
297 F.2d 851, 853-54 (4th Cir. 1962) (breaking and entry, grand larceny, and possession of burglary
tools required appointment of counsel even though the offenses were non-capital); United States ex
rel. Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1957) (Betts not applicable to experienced
youth facing robbery charges).
Most states, subsequent to Betts, discussed special circumstances and principles of fairness
based on the specific facts of each case rather than extending and applying Betts to all cases. They
considered factors such as the gravity of the crime; the age and education of the defendant; the
conduct of officials, including the court and prosecuting attorney; the complexity of the charged
offense; and any possible defenses the defendant could have. See State v. Bell, 186 A.2d 805, 808
(Conn. Cir. Ct. 1962) (citing McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 111 (1961)); see also Artrip v. State,
136 So. 2d 574, 576 (Ala. Ct. App. 1962) (no need to appoint counsel for escape from prison
charge), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Andrews v. State, 473 So. 2d 1211
(Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Swagger v. State, 296 S.W.2d 204, 206-08 (Ark. 1956) (facts surrounding
burglary case wan-anted conclusion that defendant should have had the benefit of appointed counsel);
People v. Mattson, 336 P.2d 937, 946 (Cal. 1959) (in banc) (stating that California's right to
appointed counsel is similar to the federal right in that courts should look at the facts of each case
if special circumstances exist); Kelley v. People, 206 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1949) (en bane) (circumstances
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surrounding burglary case did not warrant appointment of counsel); Beck v. Wainwright, 147 So.
2d 515 (Fla. 1962) (no right to counsel in armed robbery; state law controls, not federal; court
applied fairness test); People v. Clark, 91 N.E.2d 409, 410 (Ill. 1950) (appointment not required in
non-capital cases per Betts; applied fairness test); Carpentier v. Lainson, 84 N.W.2d 32,35-38 (Iowa
1957) (applied fairness test; state not required to appoint counsel in larceny of motor vehicle case);
Willey v. Hudspeth, 178 P.2d 246, 250-51 (Kan. 1947) (age of defendant warranted conclusion that
failure to appoint counsel rendered conviction for juvenile breaking and entry void); Gholson v.
Commonwealth, 212 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Ky. 1948) (although no statute for appointment of counsel
in felony cases, error not to appoint in concealed weapon charge); Roberts v. State, 150 A.2d 448,
450-51 (Md. 1959) (defendant not entitled to appointment of counsel where he was 29 years old and
personally familiar with the conduct of criminal proceedings); Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 140
N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 1957) (defendant charged with kidnapping and assault with dangerous
weapon entitled to counsel under state constitution because he was a "high grade moron"); People
v. Quicksall, 33 N.W.2d 904, 905-06 (Mich. 1948) (defendant charged with murder not entitled to
counsel on evidence that he was 44 years old, of keen intellect, and had substantial court
experience), cert. granted,336 U.S. 916 (1949), and aff'd, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Fogle v. State, 97
So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1957) (following Betts in a grand larceny case, Mississippi courts not authorized
to appoint counsel in non-capital cases absent special circumstances); Skiba v. Kaiser, 178 S.W.2d
373, 375-76 (Mo. 1944) (en banc) (need not appoint attorney for robbery absent unfairness and
special circumstances); People v. Eckert, 102 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677-78 (Livingston County Ct. 1950)
(although no obligation to furnish counsel, courts have power to appoint if fairness dictates); State
v. Cruse, 76 S.E.2d 320, 324-26 (N.C. 1953) (appointment proper in capital cases and others if
necessary to protect rights of accused), superseded by statute on other grounds N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ ISA-1411 (1988); State v. Magrum, 38 N.W.2d 358, 360-61 (N.D. 1949) (appointment in capital
and special circumstance cases only); In re Burson, 89 N.E.2d 651, 655-56 (Ohio 1949) (failure to
appoint counsel for accused pleading guilty in a criminal prosecution did not violate defendant's due
process); Commonwealth ex rel. Hallman v. Tees, 118 A.2d 273, 275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (per
curiam) (no requirement of assignment of counsel to those who are without aid of counsel in a noncapital case); Ex parte Epperson, 223 S.W.2d 790, 791-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1949) (necessity for
furnishing counsel to accused on trial for a non-capital case depends upon the facts of each case);
Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 46 S.E.2d 406, 410-13 (Va. 1948) (court's failure to appoint counsel for the
accused, although not requested to do so, constituted a denial of due process); State v. Lei, 365 P.2d
609, 610 (Wash. 1961) (same as Betts). Butsee Wyatt v. Wolf, 324 P.2d 548, 550 (Okla. Crim. App.
1958) (appointment in all cases).
Some examples of other fundamental rights which courts have found may deny defendant
a fair trial include the right to: a jury trial, see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; an impartial judge, see
Connelly v. United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1951); Whitaker v. McLean,
118 F.2d 596, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941); a trial conducted in substantial conformity with the law, see
Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 814, 817 (Fla. 1958); a trial in a fair tribunal, see Chessman v. Teets,
239 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 353 U.S. 928, and vacated, 354 U.S. 156 (1957);
Yancey v. State, 107 S.E.2d 265, 269-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959); Bryant v. State, 115 A.2d 502, 507
(Md. 1955); the absence of perjured testimony, see Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)
(per curiam); effective assistance of counsel, see Harvey v. United States, 215 F.2d 330, 332 (D.C.
Cir. 1954); testify on one's own behalf, see 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1994); the absence of fraud or
misconduct on the part of defense counsel, see Grandsinger v. Bovey, 153 F. Supp. 201,236-40 (D.
Neb. 1957), affd, 253 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1958); Tyson v. Warden, 84 A.2d 59 (Md. 1951); preclude
disclosure of confidential information, see People v. Kor, 277 P.2d 94, 97-100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1954); proper jury instructions, see State v. Talbert, 174 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Mo. 1943); not to have
inadmissible evidence lead to conviction, see State v. Amwine, 171 A.2d 124, 126-27 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1961); prevention of prejudicial and reversible improper comments in closing
argument by the state, see State v. Bassano, 171 A.2d 108, 113-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
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Twenty-one years later, the Supreme Court overruled Betts in
Gideon v. Wainwright.34 It rejected the ad hoc Fourteenth Amendment
approach and opted instead for an automatic process under the Sixth
Amendment.35 According to the Court, reason and reflection required
the conclusion that any indigent person brought before a criminal court
would not receive a fair trial unless the court appointed counsel to aid
him.3 6 The Court reasoned that if states find it important enough to hire
prosecutors to represent their interests, they must believe that lawyers in
criminal courts are necessary to properly conduct a trial. 37 In addition,
the Court recognized that almost every defendant who can afford to hire
counsel does so. 38 This demonstrates that attorneys "incriminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries.,, 39 The Court also stressed the ideal

embraced by American courts that every defendant is entitled to
procedural and substantive safeguards which assure him a fair trial before
an impartial tribunal and preserve equality before the law for all.40
Consequently, states must appoint counsel to represent indigent
defendants.41

In Burgett v. Texas,42 the Court further highlighted the importance
34. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
35. See id.at 342-45.
36. See id.at 344. It appears the Gideon Court felt Betts misread or misinterpreted historical
data regarding the right to counsel. The Court stated: "We think the Court in Betts had ample
precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental
safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are equally protected against state invasion
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 341. According to the Gideon
Court, even at the time of Betts, one of those fundamental safeguards was the right to counsel. "We
think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights." Id. at 342. The Court then reviewed the Supreme
Court cases addressing the right to counsel before Betts. See id.at 342-45; Smith v. O'Grady, 312
U.S. 329 (1941); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S, 444 (1940); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The
Court found that Betts made an abrupt break in the constitutional analysis of the right to counsel,
See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
37. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. See id.These safeguards include, among other things, the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and the right not to be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
41. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45. Because this case involved a felony and overruled Betts
which involved a felony, by implication Gideon applied to felonies only. However, one could argue
it was not intended to apply only to felonies, since the Court stated: "Not only these precedents but
also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him." Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
42. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
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of the right to court-appointed counsel for indigents when it held that
convictions obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment were
constitutionally invalid and could not be used to enhance the seriousness
of a subsequent conviction. 3 The Court explained that using a conviction, obtained without the assistance of counsel or a valid waiver, to
support guilt or enhance punishment for a later charge would defeat the
principles of Gideon.' Thus, a conviction gained in violation of the
right to counsel is invalid for all purposes.4"
The Court continued to develop its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
in Argersinger v. Hamlin,46 in which it held that the right to counsel
extends beyond felonies to misdemeanors which result in actual
incarceration of any duration.47 The Court contrasted the right to
counsel to the right of an accused to have a trial by jury.48 While it
recognized that the right to a jury trial had historically been limited to
capital and more serious crimes,49 the Court simultaneously pointed out
that no such historical support existed for limiting the right of an accused
to representation by counsel.5" According to the Court, the Sixth
Amendment extended the right to counsel beyond what those cases
originally provided at common law." The Court could find no evidence
in the Amendment's language, history, or previous court decisions to

43. See id. at 115.
44. The Court stated:

To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against
a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense is to erode the

principle of that case. Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of
the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth
Amendment right.

Id. (citation omitted).
45. See id.
46. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
47. See id.at 37.
48. See id. at 29-31.
49. The right to a jury trial was limited to those offenses that held a prison term of six months
or more. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
50. See Argersinger,407 U.S. at 30.
51. See id. On the contrary, the Court explained, at least twelve of the thirteen colonies
rejected the English common law rule and extended the right to counsel in all cases, including civil
and misdemeanor proceedings. See id.
In England, at common law, the assistance of counsel was provided in civil and
misdemeanor cases only, including petty offenses. A defendant charged with treason or another
felony may have had a right to the assistance of counsel but only on legal questions and only when
the defendant posed the questions himself. The colonies provided for the assistance of counsel in all
cases, with a few providing for counsel only in capital or more serious cases. See BEANEY, supra
note 30, at 14-21.
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show an intent to take away the common law right to counsel for petty
offenses. 2
The Court stated that the assistance of counsel is necessary to ensure
a fair trial and pointed to Powell and Gideon to explain the importance
of "the guiding hand of counsel. ' 3 Although the Court in Powell and
Gideon discussed the right to counsel with respect to felony cases, the

Argersinger Court held that this right need not be limited to felony
cases. 54 On the contrary, the rationale of the prior cases applies to any

circumstance in which an accused faces the loss of liberty.55 The Court
remained unconvinced that the legal and constitutional questions involved

in petty offenses with sentences of imprisonment are any less complex
because they are not felonies. 6 The Court pointed out that the accused
needs the assistance of counsel even when he decides to plead guilty
so that he will know exactly what he is doing when he agrees to the loss
of his liberty without a trial.5 In dictum, the Court also expressed a
concern that the great volume of misdemeanors may tempt the system to
engage in a speedy disposition of these cases without regard for the
fairness of the process.5 Thus, every accused should have the assistance

52. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30.
53. Id. at 31-33.
54. See id.at 32. The Court also noted other safeguards which were so "basic" they could not
be denied in petty cases: the right to a public trial, see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948); the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations, see Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 28; the
right to confrontation, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405-06 (1965); and the right to
compulsory process to obtain one's own witnesses, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23
(1967).
55. See Argersinger,407 U.S. at 32.
56. See id.
at 33. The Court cited, as an example, vagrancy cases which typically result in only
brief sentences of imprisonment, but "often bristle with thorny constitutional questions." Id. Thus,
counsel may be necessary to ensure that the accused in a misdemeanor case adequately understands
and can defend against the charges pending against him or her. See id.at 36-37.
57. See id. at 34.
58. See id.at 34-36. The Court gave statistics concerning the number of misdemeanors filed
and prosecuted in the states. See id.at 34 n.4. In addition, it pointed out that because of the great
number of cases, speed takes precedence over protecting defendants' rights. See id.at 34-35.
According to one report, public officials are often overworked and harassed, and cannot put the time
necessary into prosecuting and preparing cases. This includes police officers investigating the cases,
prosecutors who review the file on the day of trial, and defense counsel who speak with their clients
for the first time on the day of trial. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME INA FREE SOcIETY 128 (1967) [hereinafter FREE SOCIETY].
In accenting the importance of counsel in misdemeanor and petty cases, the Court stated: "One study
concluded that '[m]isdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from
police court with all charges dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without counsel."'
Argersinger,407 U.S. at 36 (quoting AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR
MISDEMEANANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1970)).
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of an attorney whose duty is to ensure that the overworked judicial
system does not trample an individual's right to a fair proceeding. 9 The
Court focused its analysis on the actual loss of liberty and declined to
address the right to counsel in a situation where the loss of liberty is not
involved.6" Rather, the right to counsel was limited to those cases in
which a jail sentence will be imposed if the accused is convicted of the
crime.6 ' In its closing remarks, the Court observed:
[E]very judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no
imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless
the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the
seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to
name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts. 62
Therefore, the Argersinger Court explicitly declared that no term of
incarceration may be imposed on the accused unless he or she is
represented by counsel. 3
In Scott v. Illinois,64 the Court answered the question left unanswered in Argersinger: whether the accused is entitled to appointed
counsel where the loss of liberty is not involved. 65 In Scott, the Court
limited the right to court-appointed counsel to those cases in which the
defendant actually received imprisonment.66 Thus, if the relevant statute
authorized imprisonment, but the trial judge did not intend to impose
such a sentence, the defendant had no right to court-appointed counsel.67 In reaching this conclusion, the Court interpreted the decision in

59. See Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37.

60. See id.; see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 386-88 & nn.18-21 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (outlining states which provide counsel in various types of cases where periods of
imprisonment are involved); Geehring v. Municipal Court, 357 F. Supp. 79, 82 (N.D. Ohio 1973)
(finding that "justice and fairness demand the appointment of counsel to any person found to be
indigent if a possibility exists that said person might lose his liberty as a result of his being prosecuted"); United States v. Rogers, 354 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Colo. 1973) (no right to appointment
of counsel in petty cases); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 456 P.2d 696, 704 (Wash. 1969) (no right to
counsel in municipal court misdemeanor cases), overruledin part by Mclnturf v. Horton, 538 P.2d
499, 500 (Wash. 1975) (entitling defendant to appointment of counsel in misdemeanor prosecution
where imprisonment for up to six months was possible).
61. See Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37.
62. Id. at 40.
63. "[I]n those [cases] that end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused
will receive the benefit of 'the guiding hand of counsel' so necessary when one's liberty is in
jeopardy." Id.
64. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
65. See id. at 373-74.
66. See i.
67. See id.
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6 8 According to the Court, the
Argersinger.
central premise of
Argersinger was that a jail sentence is entirely different from a fine or
threat of imprisonment.69 The Scott Court agreed and determined that
Argersinger created a workable standard for determining when the
accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel. 70 Any attempt to expand
the right to counsel to other situations would create confusion and
unpredictable costs for the fifty states. 7' The Court reasoned that
economic and efficiency considerations require that the right to counsel
be limited to those cases which involved the actual loss of liberty.72 As
a result, the Sixth Amendment does not require the appointment of
counsel when a criminal
defendant is merely fined or otherwise punished,
73
incarceration.
of
short

B.

The Baldasar v. Illinois Decision

After the Court's decision in Scott, the question arose whether a
valid uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could be used to convert a
later misdemeanor into a felony. The Supreme Court answered this
question in Baldasar v. Illinois.74 In Baldasar, the defendant was
convicted of an enhanced misdemeanor turned felony theft.75 During the
jury trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of his prior misdemeanor
theft conviction since Illinois law allowed such evidence to enhance a
subsequent misdemeanor theft into a felony. 76 The defendant did not
have counsel at his first trial, nor did he waive it, and was fined.77 He
had counsel at his second trial.7' At the second trial, the defendant's
attorney objected to the introduction of the first conviction. 79 She
argued that the absence of an attorney at the first trial made the
conviction too unreliable to support enhancement of a second misde-

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id.
See id. at 373.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 374.

73. See id. Despite the Supreme Court's holding, many jurisdictions prior to Scott supplied
counsel in all criminal cases, even where imprisonment was only authorized. For a recitation of such
cases and a more extensive discussion of the issue, see Scott, 440 U.S. at 385-88 & nn.18-22.
74. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruledby Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921

(1994).
75. See id. at 223.
76. See id. (citing ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(b)(5) (Vest 1973-74)).
77. See id.

78. See id.
79. See id.
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meanor8 0 The Illinois Appellate Court rejected this argument and
affirmed the jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of a felony and also
affirmed his prison sentence.81
However, the United States Supreme Court disagreed. In a per
curiam opinion, the Court overruled the Illinois Appellate Court's
decision and held that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could
not be used to enhance a subsequent misdemeanor to a felony.82 The
Justices offered several differing opinions in determining that the

defendant's felony conviction and imprisonment were obtained in
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.8 3 Justice Stewart,

with whom Justices Brennan and Stevens joined in one concurring
opinion, argued that Scott clearly forbade any imprisonment, direct or
collateral, which flows from an uncounseled conviction. 4 They believed
that since the defendant's prison sentence would not have occurred but
for the use of his prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, Scott
prevented the use of this conviction at his subsequent trial.8"
In another concurring opinion by Justice Marshall, joined by Justices
Brennan and Stevens, it was maintained that the Scott decision created

a type of conviction which is valid for some purposes, but not for

80. See id. The decision of the Illinois Appellate Court was divided with respect to this issue.
See People v. Baldasar, 367 N.E.2d 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (presiding Justice Rechenmacher
disagreeing with the majority's affirmance of the lower court's use of a prior uncounseled

misdemeanor theft conviction to elevate a subsequent misdemeanor theft offense to a felony), revd
per curiam, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
81. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 223. The appellate court held that Argersinger
was not intended to limit the use of a properly obtained, although uncounseled,
conviction in future proceedings based upon subsequent conduct of a defendant. We
believe this to be true whether such use of the conviction is sought to be made for
purposes of impeachment, sentence determination or, as in the instant case, to establish
an element of a second or subsequent offense prosecution for which an enhanced penalty
might be imposed.
Baldasar,367 N.E.2d at 463. In arriving at its decision, the court stated:
There is no language in [Argersinger] suggesting a prospective application or
readjudication of a defendant's right to counsel should he be convicted in the future of
the commission of another offense and be then subject to another sentence. The notion
that repeat offenders are subject to enhanced penalties for their conduct is so basic to our
criminal justice system that it could not have escaped the notice ofthe Argersingercourt.
Id. at 461-62. The Illinois Supreme Court refused to hear the case on appeal.
82. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 224.
83. In arriving at the percuriam decision, the BaldasarCourt wrote three separate concurring
opinions. See id. (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 22429 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 229-30
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
84. See id. at 224.
85. See id.l
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others.8 6 Since Scott determined that actual imprisonment was the
circumstance which required the appointment of counsel, no uncounseled
conviction could be used to sentence a defendant to prison, no matter
when or how that conviction took place. 7 Thus, an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction might be valid for the imposition of a fine, but
it is unquestionably invalid for the purpose of imposing a prison
sentence. 8 The Justices' main concern was the unreliability of an
uncounseled conviction. 9 They reasoned that an uncounseled conviction, unreliable to begin with, would not become more reliable just
because it was used to enhance a valid subsequent conviction.9" They
concluded that it would be illogical to hold an uncounseled misdemeanor
invalid for imposing a prison sentence directly, but valid for imposing
the same sentence indirectly, and resolved that Scott required them to
invalidate the defendant's conviction.9 1
Justice Blackmun delivered the deciding vote with his own
concurring opinion.92 In his dissent in Scott, Justice Blackmun had
argued for a "bright line" rule that mandated the appointment of counsel
for any offense punishable by incarceration beyond six months.93 In
Baldasar, Justice Blackmun adhered to this view.94 Thus, since the

defendant's first theft conviction was an offense punishable by incarceration for more than six months, Justice Blackmun believed that he should
have received court-appointed counsel.95 Since the defendant did not
receive counsel, Justice Blackmun concluded that the first conviction was
unconstitutional and therefore, under Burgett v. Texas, invalid to enhance
the misdemeanor theft into a felony.9 6 Unlike Justices Stewart, Brennan,
Stevens, and Marshall, who found the defendant's first conviction to be

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 226.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 227-29.
See id. at 227-28.
See id. at 228-29.
See id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"I would hold that an indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded

appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a nonpetty criminal offense, that is, one

punishable by more than six months' imprisonment." Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).

94. "I still am of the view that this 'bright line' approach would best preserve constitutional
values and do so with a measure of clarity for all concerned." Baldasar,446 U.S. at 230.
95. See id.
96. See id. In Burgett, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), the Supreme Court held that an uncounseled
felony conviction could not be used in a subsequent trial to enhance punishment. See id. at 115.
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valid for the imposition of a fine, Justice Blackmun insisted that the
defendant's first conviction was invalid for all purposes. 97
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and Rehnquist, dissented. According to the dissenters, Scott and
Argersinger required only that an indigent defendant receive courtappointed counsel when he suffered actual imprisonment. 98 Because the
defendant did not suffer actual imprisonment at the time of his first
conviction, they felt the conviction was constitutionally valid.9 9 They
concluded that the second conviction and sentence did not amount to
imprisonment for the first offense.1"' Thus, since the defendant had not
been imprisoned previously without the appointment of counsel, it was
the dissenters' opinion that his subsequent felony conviction and sentence
should stand.001
C.

The Impact of Justice Blackmun ' Opinion in Baldasar

Since the plurality had differing views as to why the defendant's
conviction and imprisonment had violated the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, subsequent lower courts likewise have interpreted the Baldasar
decision in conflicting ways, causing great inconsistency in both federal
and state courts. 2 Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion caused the
greatest difficulty. Although Justice Blackmun aligned himself with the
majority, there was much dispute over whether he agreed or disagreed
with the use of a prior uncounseled conviction to impose or enhance
imprisonment in a subsequent conviction.'0 3 His opinion was anchored
in the view that anyone accused of a crime which had a potential jail
term of more than six months must receive the appointment of counsel."° Therefore, because the defendant's prior misdemeanor had a

97.
98.
99.
100.

See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 230.
See id. at 233.
See id.
The dissenting Justices stated:

This line of argument [defendant's and Justice Blackmun's] misapprehends the
nature of enhancement statutes. These laws, commonplace in our criminal justice system,
do not alter or enlarge a prior sentence. If, as in this case, a person with a prior
conviction chooses to commit a subsequent crime, he thereby becomes subject to the
increased penalty prescribed for the second crime. This Court consistently has sustained
repeat-offender laws as penalizing only the last offense committed by the defendant.

Id. at 232.
101. See id. at 233.
102. See infra Part II.C.1-3.
103. See infra Part II.C.1-3.

104. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 229-30.
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possible jail sentence of more than six months, the absence of counsel in

that case rendered the resultant conviction constitutionally invalid." 5
That prior uncounseled conviction could not be used for any purpose. 10 6 This explains why Justice Blackmun's view is pivotal for any
interpretation of Baldasar.
The federal circuits, extremely confused by Justice Blackmun's
position, developed three separate interpretations ofBaldasar.Some state
courts mimicked these federal courts. However, state courts often

engaged in little discussion of Baldasar,and quite a few reached their
decisions with little or no analysis of the case. Instead, they simply stated
that Baldasarrequired the interpretation that the particular state court
gave it." 7 Thus, although Baldasar created the same disparity in state
court decisions as it did in federal court decisions, the individual states
appeared less confused about Baldasarthan the federal courts.

105. See id. at 230.
106. See id.
107. See Krewson v. State, 552 A.2d 840, 841 (Del. 1988) (holding that Baldasarforbids the
use of uncounseled convictions to enhance a sentence for a subsequent conviction); State v. Vares,
801 P.2d 555, 557 (Haw. 1990) (same); State v. Grogan, 385 NAV.2d 254,255 (Iowa 1986) (same);
State v. Oehrn, 680 P.2d 309, 312 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (same), overruled by State v. Delacruz, 899
P.2d 1042, 1047 (Kan. 1995) (adopting Nichols in affirming the use of an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction to enhance a subsequent offense); State v. Wiggins, 399 So. 2d 206, 208 (La. 1981)
(holding that an uncounseled guilty plea cannot be used to enhance punishment upon conviction of
a subsequent driving while intoxicated ("DI")offense); State v. Smith, 329 N.W.2d 564,566 (Neb.
1983) (holding that "a conviction which is invalid for purposes of imposing a sentence of
imprisonment for the offense itself remains invalid for purposes of increasing a term of imprisonment
for a subsequent conviction under a repeat-offender statute" (quoting Baldasar,446 U.S. at 228
(Marshall, L, concurring))); State v. Ulibarri, 632 P.2d 746, 748 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
Baldasarprevents any sentence enhancement which is supported by a prior uncounseled conviction);
State v. Black, 277 S.E.2d 584, 585-86 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a prior uncounseled
conviction "could not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a
subsequent conviction"); Bromley v. State, 757 P.2d 382, 385-86 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (holding
that Baldasar prevents the state from using evidence of a dismissed charge to enhance sentencing
after a guilty plea for a subsequent offense); State v. O'Brien, 666 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1984) (construing Baldasarto mean that "even if the enhanced offense is a misdemeanor with
a light penalty, an accused may not be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment unless he was
afforded the benefit of assistance of counsel in the prior as well as the predicate offense" (quoting
Ulibarri,632 P.2d at 747-48)); State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1989) (holding that
Baldasarprevents an uncounseled prior conviction from being used in a later prosecution 'either
to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense' (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.
109, 115 (1967))); State v. Armstrong, 332 S.E.2d 837, 841 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that an
uncounseled prior conviction "may not be used to enhance a sentence of imprisonment for a
subsequent offense"), overruled by State v. Hopkins, 453 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 1994) (adopting
Nichols).
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1. Interpretations Based on the Narrowest Decision
Some courts applied the narrowest interpretation of Baldasarand
simply pointed to Justice Blackmun's rationale."0 8 According to these
courts, two groups of Justices had broad opinions which were diametrically opposed: one group of Justices would unequivocally forbid the use
of all uncounseled convictions for the purpose of imposing or enhancing
imprisonment, 0 9 and the other group of Justices would unequivocally
allow the use of all uncounseled convictions for any purpose in a
subsequent conviction. 1 Contrary to these broad, all-encompassing
opinions, Justice Blackmun's opinion forbade the use of only constitutionally invalid uncounseled convictions."1 Thus, these courts held that
Justice Blackmun's opinion was the narrowest interpretation and the only
real holding of Baldasar.
The Tenth and Fourth Circuits construed Baldasarin this fashion.
In Santillanes v. United States Parole Commission,' a Tenth Circuit
case, the court explained that since none of the Baldasar opinions
commanded the support of the majority of the Justices, the holding of
Baldasarhad to be interpreted by the position of the Justices who had
based their concurrence on the narrowest grounds." 3 According to the
court, Justice Blackmun's opinion was the narrowest because it merely
held that an invalid uncounseled conviction could not be used to enhance
a later charge."' They interpreted Justice Blackmun's position as
permitting the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in a
subsequent case so long as the first crime did not carry a sentence
potential of more than six months' imprisonment.' 15 Consequently, the
court held that it had to construe Baldasaras forbidding only the use of
invalid prior uncounseled convictions, namely, those obtained in violation
of the six month rule. 1 6

108. where no opinion in a decision commands the support of the majority, the holding of the
Court is the position taken by the Justice or Justices who based their acquiescence in the decision
on the narrowest grounds. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
109. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 224-29 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Both concurring opinions were joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens.
dissenting) (joined by Burger, C.J., White & Rehnquist, JJ.).
110. See id. at 230 (Powell, J.,

111. See id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
112.
113.
114.
115.

754 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1985).
See id. at 889 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
See id.
See id.

116. See id. at 889; see also United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715, 718 (4th Cir. 1993)
("recognizing that the holding of Baldasaris limited to prohibiting the elevation of a misdemeanor
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One group of states similarly limited Baldasar's reach to Justice
Blackmun's opinion and held that it prevented the subsequent use of a
prior uncounseled conviction only when the prior conviction was
constitutionally invalid.11 7 As the federal circuits found, these states
recognized that Baldasarhad to be interpreted on its narrowest grounds.
They focused on the fact that four Justices held that no prior uncounseled
conviction could validly result in imprisonment after a second offense
and that four Justices held that any prior uncounseled conviction could
be used to increase or impose a jail sentence in a second offense.
According to these states, Baldasar'sconflicting opinions required them
to rely on the one Justice who refused to create such a broad holding.
Justice Blackmun agreed that the initial uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction in Baldasar was invalid for the purpose of increasing the
defendant's later misdemeanor conviction to a felony" s However,
according to these states, Justice Blackmun ruled this way only because
he believed that the initial conviction in Baldasarwas constitutionally
invalid. Had Justice Blackmun believed that the prior conviction was
valid, he would have aligned himself with the dissenters, which would
have formed a five-person majority and allowed its use in the prosecution
of the subsequent offense. Thus, these states insisted that the only
principle for which Baldasarcould stand was that it prevented the use of
a prior constitutionally invalid conviction to impose or enhance imprisonment in a subsequent case. Pursuant to this interpretation, these states
allowed the use of prior valid uncounseled convictions for many

to a felony by reason of an uncounseled conviction that could have resulted in imprisonment for

more than six months").
117. See State v. Orsini, 445 A.2d 887, 894 (Conn. 1982) (holding that Baldasarrequires only
that "a conviction which has been procured in violation of constitutional rights cannot be used to
increase the punishment which would ordinarily be permissible," but giving no rationale for this
interpretation); Had v. State, 585 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1991) (holding that the deciding opinion in
Baldasar was Justice Blackmun's, which forbids only the use of constitutionally invalid prior
convictions in subsequent proceedings); Ratliffv. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445,450-51 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that Baldasar only prevents the use of constitutionally invalid prior convictions), overruledby Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1996); State v. Orr, 375

NAV.2d 171, 176 (N.D. 1985) (holding that Baldasar must be interpreted according to Justice
Blackmun's opinion which forbids only the use of unconstitutionally obtained prior convictions in
subsequent proceedings); State v. LaFountain, 628 A.2d 1243, 1245-46 (Vt. 1993) (holding that

Justice Blackmun's narrow holding controls the application of Baldasarto subsequent cases); State
v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364, 367-69 (Wis. 1982) (holding that Justice Blackmun's Baldasaropinion

controls, and only the use of unconstitutionally obtained prior convictions is forbidden).
118. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 230.
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purposes, including enhancing the degree of the subsequent offense. 1 9

2. Limitation of Baldasarto Its Facts
Other courts interpreted Baldasarnarrowly by limiting it to its facts.
However, these courts did not base their rationale on Justice Blackmun's
opinion. Rather, they used his opinion as an excuse to dismiss Baldasar's
implications by determining that it applied only in a very unique factual
situation. According to these courts, Baldasar was too conflicting to
determine its ultimate holding. Since four Justices would allow the

subsequent use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction and four
Justices would not allow it, these courts claimed that there was no
common denominator upon which the concurring Justices agreed and,
therefore, no binding rule to follow. Justice Blackmun's opinion was of
no use because it was impossible to tell how he would rule if he believed

the prior uncounseled conviction was valid. Thus, according to these
courts, for precedential purposes, the opinion was four-to-four and had
to be limited to its particular facts.
Several federal circuits followed this rationale. 20 As a result, in

119. See Orsini, 445 A.2d at 894 (allowing use of valid prior felony convictions to increase
term of imprisonment for subsequent persistent felony offender conviction); Hlad,585 So. 2d at 930
(allowing fourth DUI conviction to be enhanced to a felony, even though one of previous DUI
convictions was uncounseled, because under Justice Blackmun's rationale, the prior conviction could
not have resulted in more than six months' imprisonment and was therefore valid); Ratliff, 719
S.W.2d at 449 (allowing enhancement of DUI conviction if prosecution could prove the constitutional validity of the previous uncounseled drunken driving convictions); Orr,375 N.W.2d at 176
(concluding that first DUI conviction could be used to enhance second DUI because at the time of
the first conviction defendant could not have received more than six months' imprisonment);
LaFountain,628 A.2d at 1245 (finding that defendant's third offense for driving with a suspended
license could be upgraded to a misdemeanor rather than a civil offense under the enhancement
statute through the introduction of two prior uncounseled convictions for the same offense); Novak,
318 N.W.2d at 369 (classifiying the defendant's second conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant ("OWl") as a misdemeanor and holding that he could be
sentenced to five days in jail because after his prior uncounseled conviction for the same offense he
was not subject to any jail term, therefore Baldasarwas not applicable).
120. See United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496,499-500 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that there
is no common denominator upon which all the concurring Justices in Baldasar agreed, and stating
that Baldasardoes not apply where a prior uncounseled conviction is used to enhance a defendant's
criminal history score); United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
Baldasar must be limited to its facts due to the potentially conflicting nature of the concurring
opinions and, therefore, does not forbid the use of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions during
sentencing for a subsequent crime); Moore v. Jarvis, 885 F.2d 1565, 1572-73 (1lth Cir. 1989)
(holding that Baldasar "forbid[s] only the sentencing of a defendant to an increased term of
incarceration solely upon consideration of a prior conviction obtained in a proceeding for
which... counsel was unavailableto the defendant"); Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d
341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that Baldasar "provides little guidance outside of the precise
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these jurisdictions, Baldasarcould be read only to forbid the use of a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to convert a subsequent
misdemeanor to a felony.12 1 When the prosecutor sought to use a
defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for other
purposes, such as increasing his or her criminal history points after a
later conviction, these circuits simply distinguished Baldasarand held it
inapplicable to the case before them."
In Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court,the Seventh Circuit analyzed
the Baldasar decision closely.'" In attempting to decide whether a
determination of a statutory violation in an uncounseled civil forfeiture
proceeding could be used to impose a prison sentence for a subsequent
violation of the same statute, the court expressed confusion about Justice
Blackmun's opinion. 24 Since Justice Blackmun's opinion was necessary to form a majority, the Schindler court found it had to construe
Justice Blackmun's opinion to reach a decision.'2 5 However, the court
was unable to determine whether Justice Blackmun would permit the use
of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor in a subsequent proceeding when
the first offense held no prison term whatsoever. 26 The court observed:
"Justice Blackmun's views on this question are not clear because he
expressed no opinion in Baldasaron whether an uncounseled conviction
that is valid because no prison sentence is imposed or authorized may
nonetheless be the predicate for imposing a prison term for a subsequent
offense."' 2 7 Due to the confusion over Justice Blackmun's opinion, the

factual context in which it arose," because Justice Blackmun expressed no opinion in Baldasaras

to whether a valid prior uncounseled conviction could be used in subsequent proceedings).
121. See cases cited supra note 120.
122. See Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d at 500 (Baldasardoes not apply where a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction is used to enhance a defendant's criminal history score); Thompson v.
Estelle, 642 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for
which defendant was not given a prison term could be used at punishment stage of subsequent
criminal offense); United States v. Robles-Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692, 693 (9th Cir. 1981) (uncounseled
administrative hearing resulting in deportation order could be used as basis for criminal proceeding
charging alien with illegal entry into the United States).
123. 715 F.2d at 344-45.

124. See id.; see also David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor
Convictions After Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 517, 529-30 (1982).

125. See Schindler, 715 F.2d at 344-45. Although the court agreed that it must look to the
narrowest opinion, it agreed with a Wisconsin state court, see State v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364,36768 (Wis. 1982), that there was no least common denominator in Baldasar.See Schindler, 715 F.2d
at 345 n.5.
126. See Schindler, 715 F.2d at 344-45.

127. Id.
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court concluded that Baldasarhad little use beyond its distinct facts. 2
Thus, the court declined to extend Baldasarto the situation in Schindler
and held that prior uncounseled civil adjudications could be used to
enhance a prison sentence for a subsequent offense of the same
nature.

129

A second group of states also interpreted Baldasarnarrowly by
confining it strictly to its facts. 30 These states engaged in little discus-

sion of Baldasar and its various interpretations. They simply explained
that Baldasar's holding prevents the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions in converting a subsequent misdemeanor to a
felony.'31 After stating the holding of Baldasar, these states distin-

guished it and allowed the use of prior uncounseled convictions for
various purposes, such as classifying a defendant as a habitual offender

128. See id. at 345. The court also found significant differences between Baldasarand the case
before it and held that Baldasarwas not controlling. See id.
129. See id. at 345-46. The court found Baldasarinapplicable because it believed that none of
the Justices in that case ever "suggest[ed] that [a] prior conviction [was] invalid for other collateral
purposes." Id. at 345. It further believed that the use of defendant's first civil offense for OWI was
not used in the subsequent proceeding "to 'support guilt or enhance punishment."' Id. Instead, "[the
civil adjudication had the effect of specifically putting [the defendant] on notice that he was a highrisk individual, that the State had a public policy against driving while intoxicated, and that future
violations would subject him to criminal sanctions." Id. at 346. Thus, the use of the first offense at
the subsequent proceeding was not punishment for the first offense. See id.
130. See Moore v. State, 352 S.E.2d 821, 822 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Baldasardoes
not apply where the defendant is not sentenced under an enhanced-penalty statute); Berry v. State,
561 N.E.2d 832, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that Baldasar does not apply when a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor is used to enhance a subsequent sentence, not an offense); State ex rel.
Majerus v. Carter, 693 P.2d 501, 506 (Mont. 1984) (holding that Baldasardoes not apply when prior
uncounseled traffic violations are used in a civil proceeding to declare the defendant a habitual traffic
offender); Bonds v. State, 784 P.2d 1, 2 (Nev. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that Baldasarforbids
only the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to convert a subsequent offense into a felony but
giving no rationale for this narrow interpretation); People v. Butler, 468 N.Y.S.2d 274, 277 (App.
Div. 1983) (interpreting Baldasaras being limited to those cases where the state seeks to use a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor to convert a subsequent offense into a felony); In re Kean, 520 A.2d
1271, 1277 (R.I. 1987) (interpreting Baldasaronly to mean that "a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction cannot be used under an enhanced-penalty statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanor
into a felony with a prison term," but giving no rationale for this interpretation); State v. Chance,
405 S.E.2d 375, 376 (S.C. 1991) (holding that "when a defendant [is] not actually incarcerated for
a prior uncounseled misdemeanor, that offense may be used for enhancement"); Disheroon v. State,
687 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en bane) (holding that Baldasardoes not prevent the
use of a prior uncounseled felony conviction as evidence of a defendant's prior criminal record at
trial); State v. Hickok, 695 P.2d 136, 140-41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that Baldasarprevents
only the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to convert a subsequent offense into a felony, but
offering no rationale for this narrow interpretation).
131. See cases cited supra note 130.
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32
or imposing an enhanced sentence.
In State v. Chance, the South Carolina Supreme Court attempted to
determine whether a prior uncounseled conviction for driving under the
influence ("DUI") could be used to convert a subsequent DUI offense to
a more serious crime with a prison sentence. 3 3 The court concluded
that the opinions in Baldasarwere irreconcilably divided.'34 According-

ly, Baldasarnever decided the issue of whether a conviction valid under

35
Scott could result in increased imprisonment for a second offense.
Therefore, the South Carolina Supreme Court determined that Baldasar

must be limited to its facts and an uncounseled conviction was valid for
all purposes. 136 Thus, the court allowed the prior uncounseled3 7 DUI
conviction to enhance the penalty for a subsequent DUI offense.

3. Interpretations Based on Concern for Reliability
Finally, another group of courts seemed to have no difficulty in

reconciling Justice Blackmun's opinion with the other concurring
Justices. These courts found that all of the concurring Justices were
concerned with the question of reliability of an uncounseled conviction.
Indeed, these courts interpreted the concurring Justices' opinions as
holding that prior uncounseled convictions were unreliable. Therefore,
these convictions could not be subsequently used to impose imprisonment

132. See Moore, 352 S.E.2d at 822 (holding Baldasarinapplicable because the relevant statute
was not a penalty enhancement statute and did not increase maximum commitment nor convert a
misdemeanor into a felony); Berry, 561 N.E.2d at 840 (holding Baldasar inapplicable when
attempting to use defendant's juvenile uncounseled conviction of aggravation at trial for attempted
delivery of marijuana on school grounds because the prior offense was not used to enhance the
offense but merely used to sentence defendant); Carter, 693 P.2d at 506 (finding Baldasar inapplicable in a civil habitual traffic offender proceeding and only applicable to criminal proceedings);
Butler, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 277 (stating that Baldasar did not prohibit use of defendant's prior DWI
conviction because defendant did not contend he was unrepresented in prior proceeding); Kean, 520
A.2d at 1277-78 (holding that Baldasardid not prohibit use of prior juvenile DUI offense in second
juvenile DUI offense because there was no evidence defendant did not waive counsel in prior
proceeding); Chance, 405 S.E.2d at 376 (holding that Baldasar did not prohibit use of first DUI at
second DUI proceeding because defendant was not imprisoned for first DUI offense); Disheroon,
687 S.W.2d at 334 (finding that defendant's prior felony conviction for swindling could be used
during sentencing for aggravated robbery as evidence of prior criminal history, because there was
no evidence that defendant was indigent, he was not represented by counsel, and he did not waive
counsel); Hickok, 695 P.2d at 144 (holding that prior first degree theft guilty plea could be used at
sentencing for defendant's subsequent willful failure to return to work release facility).
133. 405 S.E.2d at 375.
134. See id. at 375-76.
135. See id. at 375.
at 376.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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on the defendant. According to these courts, this underlying rationale of
Baldasar was clear despite Justice Blackmun's seemingly unclear
opinion. In fact, these courts argued that Justice Blackmun was just as
concerned about reliability as were the other concurring Justices. Thus,

if the main concern of the concurring Justices was to ensure the
reliability of convictions resulting in imprisonment, then the narrowest

holding of Baldasarforbids the use of any prior uncounseled conviction
because of its unreliable nature.

Four circuits adopted this rationale. 3 ' These courts argued that if
an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not support a term of
imprisonment on its own merits, its use in a subsequent conviction to
enhance or increase a prison sentence should be constitutionally
forbidden. Thus, these circuits held that Baldasarprecluded the use of
a prior uncounseled conviction for any purpose that involved imprisonment.
In Wang v. Withworth, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether Baldasarprecluded the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
to impose an enhanced prison term and to impose an enhanced felony
charge.' 39 The court recognized that "Baldasarprohibits the use of [an]
uncounseled conviction to 'be used collaterally to impose an increased
term of imprisonment.... 4 0 The court interpreted this statement to mean
that a defendant may not be subjected to an increased prison sentence
through any means.141 Since the object of the enhanced felony charge
was to subject the defendant to a greater deprivation of liberty, the court
held that Baldasar precluded the use of the prior uncounseled misdemeanor to achieve this end. 42
138. See United States v. Norquay, 987 F.2d 475, 482 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that Baldasar
unquestionably prevents a court from using uncounseled misdemeanor convictions as a basis for
enhancing a defendant's sentence for a subsequent offense); United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402,
408 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[E]ven a narrow reading of Baldasarproscribes the use of a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction to enhance a defendant's sentence upon a subsequent conviction under the
sentencing guidelines."), cert. granted in part, 114 S.Ct. 39 (1993), and affd, 114 S.Ct. 1921
(1994); United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that Baldasarclearly
holds that an "'uncounseled misdemeanor conviction [may) not be used collaterally to impose an
increased term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction' (alteration in original) (quoting
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by Nichols v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994))); Wang v. Withworth, 811 F.2d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that Baldasar clearly prevents the use of an uncounseled conviction to impose
imprisonment, no matter when the conviction occurred).
139. 811 F.2d at 955.
140. Id. (quoting Baldasar,446 U.S. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
141. See id.
142. See id.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
Baldasarcreated a class of convictions which were valid for one purpose
and invalid for another.143 According to the court, "[t]he imposition by

Baldasarof a 'limited use' requirement on uncounseled convictions is a
logical extension of the Court's decision in Scott and Burgett v.
Texas."' Thus, Baldasar's holding addressed the concern raised in
those cases: protecting the accused from imprisonment as a result of an
uncounseled conviction.1 41 In keeping consistent this interpretation of
Baldasar,the court in Wang precluded the use of the defendant's prior
uncounseled conviction
to convert the defendant's subsequent offense
46
into a felony charge.'
Like the federal courts, a large number of states interpreted Baldasar
broadly and extended the case beyond its facts, holding that it prevented
47
the use of prior uncounseled convictions in a variety of situations.'

143. See id.
144. Id. (citation omitted).
145. See id.
146. See id. at 955-56.
147. See Pananen v. State, 711 P.2d 528, 532 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a prior
uncounseled civil forfeiture cannot be used to impose a jail term for a second conviction because,
according to Baldasar,"an uncounseled conviction is simply too unreliable to be depended on for

purposes of imposing a sentence of incarceration'); State v. Brown, 675 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Ark.
1984) (holding that Baldasar prevents the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to convert a
subsequent misdemeanor into a felony); People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121, 1126 (Colo. 1980) (en
banc) (discussing the unreliability of uncounseled convictions and holding that a state "Driving After
Judgment Prohibited statute must be construed to prohibit use of a conviction obtained without
benefit or waiver of counsel as a part of the foundation for the sentence of imprisonment which is
mandated for violation of that statute"); People v. Finley, 568 N.E.2d 412, 415 (I11.
App. Ct. 1991)
(discussing the unreliability of uncounseled convictions and holding that "the use of defendant's
prior uncounseled DUI conviction to enhance his current offense to a Class 4 felony is prohibited
by Baldasar"); State v. Dowd, 478 A.2d 671, 677 (Me. 1984) (holding that Baldasar prohibits the
use of a prior uncounseled conviction for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol
to enhance the penalty of defendant's later conviction for operating his vehicle without a license);
People v. Stratton, 384 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that Baldasar
prohibits the use of a prior uncounseled conviction for operating a motor vehicle under the influence
to convert a subsequent "operating under the influence" misdemeanor into a felony); State v.
Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn. 1983) (holding that Baldasar forbids the use of a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor DWI conviction to convert a subsequent DWI offense into a gross misdemeanor); State v. Wilson, 684 S.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that Baldasar
forbids the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to enhance the punishment for a subsequent
offense, but upholding the defendant's conviction after finding he waived his right to counsel at the
prior conviction); State v. Laurick, 575 A.2d 1340, 1347 (N.J. 1990) (holding that Baldasar
unquestionably prevents the use of a prior uncounseled DWI conviction to impose a higher sentence
for a subsequent DWI conviction); State v. Baldauf, 586 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that Baldasar prevents a defendant's prior misdemeanor conviction from being "used
collaterally to enhance his subsequent conviction to a higher degree where such enhanced crime is
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These state courts found that the concurring Justices in Baldasarwere
concerned about the unreliability of uncounseled convictions and did not
intend to merely prevent the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction in converting a second misdemeanor to a felony. Instead, they
meant to preclude the use of prior uncounseled convictions in a variety
of situations. Some states extended Baldasar to prevent the use of
uncounseled misdemeanors in increasing the sentence of a subsequent
conviction. 48 Other states went further and held that Baldasarprecluded the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to convert a
subsequent misdemeanor into a gross misdemeanor or a second level
misdemeanor.'4 9 Finally, some states interpreted Baldasar even more
broadly, holding that the case prevented the use of uncounseled civil
sanctions or forfeitures to convert a second offense to a misdemeanor
which resulted in imprisonment.15
In People v. Roybal, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a prior uncounseled traffic conviction could be used to
support the determination that the defendant was a habitual traffic
offender, a felony offense."' In analyzing Baldasar,the court recognized the opinion's confusing nature. 2 The court, however, was able
to discern the central idea behind Baldasar,namely, that uncounseled
convictions are too unreliable to support the severe sanction of deprivation of liberty.'53 According to the Colorado court, Baldasar merely
followed the requirements of Argersinger in determining that a
defendant's conviction without the defendant having the assistance of
counsel was inherently unreliable.'5 4 Thus, the Colorado court had no
difficulty in determining that Baldasar prevented the use of prior

punished by imprisonment"); City of Pendleton v. Standerfer, 688 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. 1984) (in banc)

(interpreting Baldasaras holding that "[i]f the initial uncounseled misdemeanor conviction cannot
be used directly to impose a prison term, then it cannot be used indirectly either to elevate a
subsequent charge from a misdemeanor to a felony or to impose an increased term of imprisonment"); Sargent v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 895, 899 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (explicitly interpreting
Baldasarbroadly and holding that the decision prevents the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor

to increase the sentence for a subsequent misdemeanor).
148. See, e.g., Roybal, 618 P.2d at 1126; Dowd, 478 A.2d at 677; Wilson, 684 SAV.2d at 547;
Laurick, 575 A.2d at 1347; Baldauf, 586 N.E.2d at 240; Standzrfer, 688 P.2d at 70; Sargent, 360
S.E.2d at 899.
149. See, e.g., Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d at 905.
150. See, e.g., Pananen, 711 P.2d at 532.
151. 618 P.2d at 1124-26.

152. Seeid. at 1125.
153. See id. at 1126.

154. See id.
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convictions to support or enhance subsequent imprisonment at any
time.' According to the court, uncounseled convictions were simply

too unreliable to be used for any purpose other than an initial sanction
not involving a prison sentence.15 6 Consequently, different courts have
used Justice Blackmun's opinion to structure diametrically opposed
interpretations of Baldasar.
4. Miscellaneous Treatment of Baldasar
57 and the
The First Circuit avoided interpreting Baldasar,'
Third

Circuit has had no occasion to address the arguments in Baldasar.
Likewise, several states have found various ways to avoid interpreting
Baldasar 58 Neither Maryland nor South Dakota has had the opportunity to address a Baldasarsituation.
I'.

THE RATIONALE AND HOLDING OF NICHOLS V. UNITED STATES

159
The Baldasaropinion was reversed by Nichols v. United States.
The defendant in Nichols plead guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine

with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.60 In
determining the defendant's sentence, pursuant to the United States
Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines"), 16 ' the United

155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759 (lst Cir. 1990). The First Circuit avoided
interpreting Baldasarby finding that the defendant waived counsel at the prior proceeding. See id.

at 762.
158. See State v. Natoli, 764 P.2d 10, 12 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc) (holding that the use of a prior
uncounseled conviction is not forbidden where the accused waived his right to counsel in a prior
proceeding); People v. Wohl, 276 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that Baldasardoes not
apply where the accused voluntarily pled guilty to the prior offense); State v. Maxey, 873 P.2d 150,
152 (Idaho 1994) (avoiding interpretation of Baldasarbyapplying a broader state law which requires
the appointment of counsel if the accused has been convicted of previous DUI violations); Sheffield
v. City of Pass Christian, 556 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Miss. 1990) (avoiding having to interpret Baldasar
by finding that no rule of law can be gleaned from the case); State v. Grondin, 563 A.2d 435, 43940 (N.H. 1989) (holding that Baldasardoes not apply where the accused is collaterally attacking his
conviction); City of Laramie v. Cowden, 777 P.2d 1089, 1090 (,yo. 1989) (allowing a prior
uncounseled bond forfeiture to serve as a prior conviction for enhancement purposes and engaging
in no discussion or interpretation of Baldasar).
159. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
160. See id. at 1924.
161. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1995). The Sentencing Guidelines were developed
to further "deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation." Id. § IA2. There are two
categories used by the sentencer in sentencing a defendant: offense behavior and offender
characteristics. See id. The sentencing court is required to sentence within the range unless the facts
presented before it are unique. See id. The court is then allowed to depart from the range, either
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee assessed him

three criminal history points for a 1983 federal felony drug conviction. 62 The court then assessed him an additional criminal history point
for his 1983 state misdemeanor DUI conviction.' 63 In that case, he had
received a fine, but was not incarcerated." 6 He did not have the
assistance of counsel at this 1983 misdemeanor conviction.16 The
additional criminal history point increased the term for which he could
be sentenced to prison from a maximum of seventeen years and six

upwards or downwards. See id.; see also Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992)
(holding that "federal district courts have authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a
substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an
unconstitutional motive").
There are three principal objectives set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines: (1) to enhance
the ability of the justice system to combat crime through effective, fair sentencing; (2) reasonable
uniformity for similar offenders who commit similar crimes; and (3) proportionality. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3.
There are six categories of ranges under the Sentencing Guidelines which are determined
based on a defendant's criminal history points. Criminal history points are based on the defendant's
prior criminal record. See id. § 5A. Although this may sound simple, to render a sentence under the
Sentencing Guidelines, a detailed and thorough procedure is used. See id. § IBI1..
In determining a sentence, the judge must consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission... and that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable
guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission... ;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission ... that is in
effect on the date the defendant is sentenced;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994).
162. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
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months to a maximum of nineteen years and seven months. 166 In

keeping with this additional criminal history point, the district court
sentenced him to the maximum term allowed under the Sentencing
Guidelines. 67 This term was twenty-five months longer than it would
have been had the court not used the defendant's prior uncounseled

misdemeanor conviction to increase his criminal history points.
The defendant objected to the district court's use of his 1983

misdemeanor conviction to establish his sentence, claiming that
consideration of this uncounseled conviction in enhancing his sentence
for a later offense violated his Sixth Amendment rights under
Baldasar.t6 8 The district court, however, rejected the defendant's
argument by construing Baldasar narrowly.'69 It explained that

Baldasarwas inapplicable to the defendant's case because the absence
of a majority opinion in that case allowed it to stand only for the limited
proposition that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may not be
used to turn a second misdemeanor into a felony with a prison sentence.170 Since the present offense was already defined as a felony, the
7
court ruled that Baldasar did not apply to the defendant's case.' '

Thus, the use of his prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to

166. See id.
167. See id. at 1925. The district court sentenced the defendant to 235 months, where the range
was 188-235 months. See United States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 281 (E.D. Tenn. 1991), aff'd,
979 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. grantedin part, 114 S. Ct. 39 (1993), and affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921
(1994). It found the highest level appropriate as it did "not significantly underrepresent the
defendant's criminal history which, except for the 1988 incident, contains only one other (albeit
serious) drug conviction." Id. at 281.
168. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
169. See id.
170. See Nichols, 763 F. Supp. at 279. In his brief to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued
that even a narrow interpretation of Baldasarprevents the use of the prior uncounseled conviction
because a majority of the Justices did agree that a court should not use a defendant's prior
uncounseled conviction to increase the defendant's sentence in a subsequent case when the defendant
could have received more than six months' imprisonment for the prior uncounseled conviction. See
Petitioner's Brief at 23, Nichols (No. 92-8556).
Thus, even under the narrowest reading of the majority opinion in Baldasar,the view of
Justice Blackmun, the petitioner's sentence should not have been enhanced because of
the previous DUI conviction because Nichols was subject to more than six months
imprisonment. Since the previous conviction was also used to increase his sentence in this
case, the enhancement was unconstitutional according to the view of the four other
concurring Justices in Baldasar. Therefore, the previous uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction should not have been considered to enhance petitioner's sentence in this case.
Id. at 34-35.
171. See Nichols, 114S. Ct. at 1924.
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enhance his sentence for the current felony conviction did not violate the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 72
Although the defendant appealed the district court's decision, a
divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision. 7 3 The appellate court agreed with
the district court's interpretation of Baldasar and held that Baldasar
merely limits the collateral use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction in converting a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony. 74
The dissent, however, insisted that Baldasar stands for the broader
principle that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction cannot be
used in any way to enhance the sentence of a subsequent offense.175
Therefore, the dissent concluded that Baldasar should apply to the
defendant's case and the district court's decision should be reversed. 76
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court analyzed Baldasar,
reviewed each opinion, and explained that the case evinced no clear
majority opinion. 77 The Court then reviewed the federal circuits'
various interpretations of Baldasar 78 These inconsistent interpretations
demonstrated that Baldasarwas a very troublesome case and the lower
courts' attempts to apply it to the Sixth Amendment rights of citizens
created nothing but uncertainty and confusion. 79 Although the Court
briefly discussed the possibility of interpreting Baldasaron its narrowest
grounds, preventing only the subsequent use of an invalid uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction, the Court ultimately rejected this consideration,
and refused "to pursue [this argument] to the utmost logical possibility
when [Baldasar]has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts
which have considered it."'180
172.
173.
174.
175.

See id.
See id. at 1925.
See id.
See id. The dissenting circuit judge found the facts of Nichols' case exactly the same as

the facts in Baldasar.He concluded that the difference between enhancement statutes and sentencing
guidelines was a "distinction without a constitutional difference." United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d
402, 408 (6th Cir. 1992) (Jones, J., dissenting in part), cert. granted in part, 114 S. Ct. 39 (1993),
and aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
176. See Nichols, 979 F.2d at 408.
177. See Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1926-27.

178. See id. The Court noted that the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits limited Baldasarto its
facts. See id. at 1925 n.8. In comparison, the Court also found that the Ninth Circuit allowed no
imprisonment in any subsequent case. See id. The Court also reviewed various states' interpretations
of Baldasar.See id. at 1925 n.7.
179. See id. at 1927.
180. Id. In his brief, the defendant conceded that courts have interpreted Baldasarin various
ways. See Petitioner's Brief at 19, Nichols (No. 92-8556). However, the defendant advocated the
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Instead, the Court elected to overrule Baldasar,reverting back to the
t AccordSixth Amendment analysis that ended with Scott v. lllinios."'
ing to Chief Justice Rehnquist, a logical consequence of the Scott

decision was that a valid uncounseled misdemeanor conviction-i.e., an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction which did not result in actual
imprisonment--may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a

subsequent offense even though that sentence entails imprisonment.'82
The Court stated that enhancement statutes, such as criminal history

provisions (federal) and recidivist statutes (states), do not violate Scott
because they do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction.1 3 Rather, the statutes penalize only the later offense." Thus, so
long as the accused has had the benefit of counsel at his later trial which

results in a conviction, an increase in sentence based upon a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction does not violate Scott." 5
In further support of the decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained
that reliance on these prior convictions is consistent with the traditional
understanding of the sentencing process, which has always been less
exacting than the process of establishing guilt.'86 He explained that

interpretation which concluded that Baldasarprecludes the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions in any sentence enhancement procedure. See id. at 34-35. He also urged the Court to
adopt an "authorized imprisonment approach" whereby a defendant would have the right to
appointed counsel whenever he was accused of a crime authorizing imprisonment for a period longer
than six months. See id. at 36-37. This approach, according to the defendant, would be more in
keeping with the progression of Supreme Court decisions since Powell, and would alleviate any
future confusion about whether a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could be used in a
subsequent sentencing proceeding. See id. at 37-44. In addition, such an approach would also achieve
the purposes intended by recidivism statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines because repeat offenders
could legitimately and reliably pay the consequences of committing repeated crimes. See id.
The Supreme Court did not address the defendant's authorized imprisonment standard
argument.
181. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927-28.
182. See id. at 1927.
183. See id. The ACLU, however, in its Amicus Brief, argued that the BaldasarJustices agreed
that when a prior offense is used to enhance a subsequent sentence, the enhancement is attributable
to the prior offense. See ACLU Amicus Brief at 7-9, Nichols (No. 92-8556). In addition, the ACLU
argued that a majority in Baldasar agreed that "an uncounseled conviction that is insufficiently
reliable to provide a basis for a sentence ofincarceration is also insufficiently reliable to form a basis
for a subsequent automatic enhancement of a sentence of imprisonment." Id. at 9.
184. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927. However, the defendant argued that "[i]fan uncounseled
conviction cannot, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, support a term of imprisonment initially,
the existence of a subsequent conviction does not make an increased term of imprisonment based
on that conviction constitutionally more palatable." Petitioner's Brief at 32, Nichols (No. 92.8556).
The Supreme Court did not address this argument.
185. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
186. See id. at 1927-28.
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sentencing judges have always conducted broad inquiries into a wide
variety of factors when determining the appropriate sentence for a
particular offender. 7 These factors go beyond the mere determination
of guilt and allow sentencing judges to consider the offender's past
behavior in determining the price he or she should pay for the crime

currently charged.' 88 One important factor is his or her past convictions.8 9 State recidivism statutes and the criminal history component
of the Sentencing Guidelines acknowledge the significance of this factor.' In addition, sentencing courts also consider an offender's past
criminal behavior short of a conviction. 9' As a result, the Court
187. See id. Several factors which courts may use in sentencing defendants include, but are not
limited to, a prior criminal and juvenile record, see infra note 190, and defendant's refusal to
cooperate with government officials, see Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980). Other
factors include the seriousness of the offense; history and characteristics of the defendant; financial
condition; education; employment background; social history, including family relationships and
activities; resident history; medical history; and the extent of the victim's loss or injury. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.231 (West 1996); 730 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-3-2 (West 1992); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. § 390.30 (McKinney 1994).
188. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
189. See id.
190. See id.All states have recidivist statutes. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1994); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.145 (Michie 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604 (West Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-4-501 (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 666-669 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16-13-101, -103 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40 (West
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4214-4215 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-104a (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (Supp. 1996); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 706-662, -665 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (1987); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-53(c)(8) (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 902.8 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (Michie
Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (West Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 362 (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 643B (Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 279, § 25 (West 1981); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 769.10-.12 (West Supp. 1996); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.152 (West Supp. 1997); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-81 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 558.016 (West Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-501 to -502 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 29-2221(1) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.010 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 651:6 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-4 (Vest 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Michie
1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.1
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11 (B)(1)(b)(3)(b) (Anderson Supp. 1996) (for offenses committed prior to July 1, 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 51 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725 (1995); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 97145(b)(1) (1982); RI. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21(a) (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (Law Coop. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-7 (Michie 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-106(c),
-107(c), -108(c) (1990); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-407 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1
(Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (Supp.
1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.62 (West Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-201 (Michie 1996).
191. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928; see also Watkins v. Thomas, 623 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir.
1980) (evidence of two prior federal convictions, for which defendant had received a presidential
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concluded that the defendant could have been sentenced more severely

for his drug conviction "based simply on evidence of the underlying
conduct which gave rise to the previous DUI offense.""19 According to
the Court, since the prosecutor need only prove this underlying conduct
by a preponderance of the evidence, it must be constitutional to consider
a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction based on the same conduct
which had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 93 Thus, the Court

pardon, was properly introduced at sentencing stage); United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 113637 (9th Cir. 1979) (sentencing judge may consider other offenses of which defendant had been
acquitted); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976) (same); United
States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 314 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); Micelli v. LeFevre, 444 F. ,Supp. 1187,
1190-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Smiley v. State, 435 So. 2d 202,205 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (trial
judge may properly consider arrest record of defendant during sentencing); Evans v. State, 550 P.2d
830, 847 (Alaska 1976) (trial judge could properly consider defendant's prior arrest for sale of
narcotics even though charge did not result in conviction); State v. Cawley, 648 P.2d 142, 144 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1982) (defendant's history of peculiar sexual behavior, prowling, and voyeurism discussed
in presentence report and in Navy record, although not resulting in convictions, properly could be
considered in sentencing); State v. Kelly, 595 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (sentencing
judge may consider prior offense of which defendant had been acquitted); People v. Wagoner, 152
Cal. Rptr. 639, 646 (Ct. App. 1979) (trial court did not prejudice defendant by considering arrests
which did not result in conviction in his probation report when sentencing defendant to state prison
instead of committing defendant to a rehabilitation center); Jansson v. State, 399 So. 2d 1061, 1064
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (sentencing judge properly considered presentence report, indicating
defendant had been arrested on 18 prior occasions); People v. Lemke, 338 N.E.2d 226,228 (I11.
App.
Ct. 1975) (defendant's prior arrest and dismissal for a drug related crime was relevant at defendant's
current sentencing for unlawful delivery of cocaine); Arthur v. State, 499 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ind.
1986) (in imposing sentence for attempted murder, trial judge properly considered that defendant had
been arrested 39 times as an adult and 9 times as a juvenile); Lottie v. State, 406 N.E.2d 632, 640
(Ind. 1980) (sentencing judge may consider other offenses of which defendant had been acquitted);
State v. Swartz, 278 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 1979) (trial court properly considered prior conviction
which had been set aside because of illegal search and another charge which had been dismissed
following the sustaining of motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment in imposing sentence
on defendant); State v. Baldwin, 629 P.2d 222, 224 (Mont. 1981) (sentencing judge may consider
other offenses of which defendant had been acquitted); State v. Hayes, 246 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Neb.
1976) (same); State v. Wells, 265 N.W.2d 239, 242-43 (N.D. 1978) (same); Commonwealth v.
Straw, 361 A.2d 427, 428-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (same).
The trial court may also consider juvenile charges. See State v. Lewis, 407 A.2d 955, 957-58
(Conn. 1978) (in sentencing defendant to life in prison as persistent felony offender following
robbery conviction, trial court properly considered presentence report containing six references to
prior juvenile difficulties even though each allegation was eventually dismissed); People v. Gray, 336
N.W.2d 491, 493 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (in sentencing defendant who pled guilty to breaking and
entering, trial judge properly considered, for purposes of determining sentencing, prior juvenile
charges that did not result in conviction).
192. Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1928.
193. See id. The defendant argued that the entire line of prior Supreme Court cases focused on
the unreliable nature of uncounseled convictions. See Petitioner's Brief at 32-34, Nichols (No. 928556). According to the dissenters in Nichols, these cases acknowledged that uncounseled
convictions are per se unreliable. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
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overruled Baldasar,stating that "an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was imposed, is also valid
when used to enhance punishment for a subsequent conviction."'"
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment. 9 ' While he agreed that
the use of the defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to
increase his sentence for a later crime did not infringe upon his right to
the assistance of counsel, Justice Souter argued that the Court did not
need to overrule Baldasarto reach their conclusion. 96 On the contrary,
he argued that Baldasarwas not controlling precedent.'9 7 Once again,
Justice Blackmun's opinion caused difficulty. 9 According to Justice
Souter, since Justice Blackmun's opinion in Baldasardid not accept the
premise that the prior uncounseled conviction was valid under Scott, but
rather insisted that certain uncounseled convictions are invalid for any
purpose, the Baldasaropinion did not represent a majority of Justices
who agreed that Scott allowed automatic sentence enhancement based on
prior uncounseled convictions.'99 Thus, Justice Souter concluded that
the Baldasardecision embodied the opinions of an equally divided Court
and was therefore entitled to no precedential value."'
Once Justice Souter concluded that Baldasarcould not be used as
controlling precedent, he reexamined Scott. In doing so, he recognized
that the Scott Court determined that "the concern over reliability raised
by the absence of counsel is tolerable when a defendant does not face the
deprivation of his liberty."' ' Justice Souter acknowledged that Scott

(joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ.). As a result, if a later sentencing court uses these convictions
to enhance sentencing, the court will be relying on a proceeding which the Supreme Court has
previously ruled to be per se unreliable. See id. According to the defendant, this problem is exacer-

bated in the case of the Sentencing Guidelines because criminal history points provide for an
automatic increase in the defendant's possible sentence range. See Petitioner's Brief at 11. The
sentencing judge must sentence the defendant within this range. See id. Thus, the judge has no
discretion to ignore the increased criminal history points if he believes that the prior uncounseled
conviction was unreliable. See id.

194. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928. The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that due
process requires a misdemeanor defendant to be warned that his conviction might be used for
enhancement purposes should he be convicted of a later crime. See id. The Court explained that there

would be no way to memorialize such a warning since a large number of misdemeanor convictions
occur in courts which are not courts of record. See id. In addition, it would be impossible to
determine how expansive such a warning must be. See id.
195. See id. at 1929-31.
196. See id. at 1929.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Id. (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979)).
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would be violated if a defendant was given an increased prison term
based solely on the existence of a prior uncounseled conviction. 2°
However, he argued that this difficult situation did not occur in Nichols
since "the Sentencing Guidelines do not provide for automatic enhancement based on prior uncounseled convictions."2 3 Instead, Justice
Souter argued, they allow for punishment of a pattern of criminal
conduct, rather than convictions. 20 4 Thus, they do not bind a district
court to automatically increase a prison sentence based on the number of
previous convictions. 20 5 In addition, the Sentencing Guidelines explicitly allow the district court to depart from the range of sentences for a
particular criminal history category if the court finds that the sentencing
range does not adequately capture the accused's actual criminal
history.2 6 Therefore, a defendant has the chance to convince a sentencing judge that a particular prior uncounseled conviction was unreliable
and does not demonstrate that he or she is likely to continue such
conduct in the future. 0 7 Since the Sentencing Guidelines allow a
defendant to rebut the negative impact of a prior uncounseled conviction,
it does not ignore the potential unreliability of such convictions. 08
In addition, Justice Souter observed that the historic understanding
of the sentencing process allows a judge to consider previous
202. See id.
203. Id. at 1930.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 (1995)). In making his
decision, Justice Souter found dispositive that "the [Sentencing] Guidelines authorize downward
departure 'where the court concludes that a defendant's criminal history category significantly overrepresents the seriousness of a defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will
commit further crimes."' 1a (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3); see also
United States v. Whitehorse, 909 F.2d 316, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding the release of an
alcoholic inmate on an unsupervised furlough by prison officials constituted a mitigating factor
warranting downward departure); United States v. Terry, 900 F.2d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding improper upward sentencing departure where the district court failed to specify aggravating
circumstances pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(h) (1994)), superseded by statute as stated in United
States v. Lee, 22 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pridgen, 898 F.2d 1003, 1004-05 (5th
Cir. 1990) (concluding that the trial court properly departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines
due to aggravating circumstances surrounding bank robbery); United States v. Newsome, 894 F.2d
852, 856-57 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that a court cannot exceed the sentencing range imposed by the
Sentencing Guidelines without a finding of aggravating circumstances, even if the sentencing range
was specified in defendant's plea bargaining arrangement).
207. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1930. "A defendant may show, for example, that his prior
conviction resulted from railroading an unsophisticated indigent, from a frugal preference for a low
fine with no counsel fee, or from a desire to put the matter behind him instead of investing the time
to fight the charges." Id.
208. See id.
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uncounseled misdemeanor convictions in determining the sentence of a
later crime.2"9 This process allows a judge to consider a broad range of
information in determining the appropriate sentence for a recidivist
defendant. 210 Fairness requires only that the accused receive a reasonable opportunity to show the sentencer that the information upon which
he or she seeks to rely is inaccurate or irrelevant to the consideration of
the sentence. 2n Thus, since the Sentencing Guidelines give the accused
an opportunity to convince the judge that he or she should not rely on a
prior uncounseled conviction in increasing the sentence for a subsequent
crime, reliability concerns are satisfied. 1 2 Therefore, Justice Souter
determined that the Nichols majority was correct in its conclusion that
the defendant's increased sentence did not violate his constitutional
213
rights.
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg joined in a dissenting
opinion.2t 4 According to these Justices, the majority's holding violated
both the holding in Scott and the "faithful ... concern for reliability that
lies at the heart of [the] Sixth Amendment cases., 215 The dissenters
reviewed the Sixth Amendment cases beginning with Gideon v.
Wainwright 16 and concluded that one principle was unquestionably
clear: no imprisonment may be imposed on the basis of an uncounseled
conviction.17 Scott solidified this principle with its holding that any
actual imprisonment, no matter how short, requires that the accused
receive the assistance of counsel.2 1 s They argued that the Baldasar
opinion adhered to this principle when a majority of the Justices
concluded that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be
used to support a prison term at any time, whether at the earlier

209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. The Court stated:
Where concern for reliability is accommodated, as it is under the Sentencing Guidelines,
nothing in the Sixth Amendment or our cases requires a sentencing court to ignore the
fact of a valid uncounseled conviction, even if that conviction is a less confident indicator
of guilt than a counseled one would be.

Id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 1931. Justice Souter, however, refused to "endorste] language in the Court's
opinion that may be taken as addressing the constitutional validity of a sentencing scheme that
automatically requires enhancement for prior uncounseled convictions." Id.
214. See id.at 1931-37.
215. Id.at 1931.

216. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
217. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931.
218. See id. at 1932 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979)).
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conviction, or at the time of a subsequent offense.219 The Nichols
dissenters refuted the majority's claim that its holding was the logical
consequence of Scott's actual imprisonment standard." On the contrary, the dissenting Justices argued that "[i]t is more logical, and more
consistent with the reasoning in Scott, to hold that a conviction that is
invalid for imposing a sentence for the offense itself remains invalid for
increasing the term of imprisonment imposed for a subsequent conviction."" According to the dissenters, the use of a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction to enhance an offender's later sentence violates
Scott because it directly results in a sentence of imprisonment based on
an uncounseled conviction.' 2 If not for the use of the uncounseled
conviction, the accused either would not receive any time in prison or
would receive a shorter prison sentence. Thus, the uncounseled conviction directly results in a deprivation of the defendant's liberty.223 This
result is one which Scott explicitly forbids. 4
According to the dissenters in Nichols, the majority abrogated the
Court's concern for reliability. Since "imprisonment is a punishment
'different in kind' from fines or the threat of imprisonment, [the Court]
consistently ha[s] read the Sixth Amendment to require that courts
decrease the risk of unreliability, through the provision of counsel, where
a conviction results in imprisonment. ' 6 The dissenters explained that

219. See id. (citing Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222,224 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring); id.
at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).

In the Nichols dissent, Justice Blackmun included a footnote explaining his intention in his
concurring opinion in Baldasar.See id. at 1932 n.1. According to Justice Blacknun, he did not
intend to imply that the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to impose a prison
sentence was permissible at any time, regardless of whether the underlying misdemeanor was

punishable by more or less than six months in prison.
Although I based my decision [in Baldasar]on my belief that the uncounseled conviction

was invalid in the first instance because Baldasar was charged with an offense punishable
by more than six months in prison, I expressed no disagreement, and indeed had none,
with the premise that an uncounseled conviction that was valid under Scott was invalid

for purposes of imposing increased incarceration for a subsequent offense. Obviously,
logic dictates that, where the threat of imprisonment is enough to trigger the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of counsel, the actual imposition of imprisonment through an
enhancement statute also requires the appointment of counsel.

Id. (citation omitted).
220. See id. at 1933.
221. Id.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (citation omitted).
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the overriding concern in the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has
been to ensure that all indigent defendants receive the assistance of
counsel when faced with imprisonment.' They argued that it should
not matter whether the prison sentence is imposed in the first instance or
at a later date as a result of an enhancement statute.2 28 An uncounseled
conviction remains unreliable, no matter when it is used.229
The dissenters also refuted the majority's claim that the use of an
uncounseled conviction to enhance a sentence is permissible because,
traditionally, "the process of sentencing is 'less exacting' than the process
of establishing guilt.""23 According to the dissenters, this does not
obviate the need for reliability. 1 When a prior conviction is introduced at a sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge hears only the fact
of the conviction, not the circumstances surrounding it.232 Thus, the
judge will be unaware of the absence of counsel and the concomitant
unreliability of the prior conviction.233 In addition, the prosecution's
introduction of a prior conviction traditionally carries significant weight

227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id. In its brief, the United States argued that the use of a prior uncounseled conviction to
enhance sentencing is permissible because "a sentencing judge 'may appropriately conduct an inquiry
broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source
from which it may come."' Respondent's Brief at 21-22, Nichols (No. 92-8556) (quoting United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)). Thus, since a sentencing judge may consider other
arguably unreliable information in determining a defendant's sentence, he should certainly be able
to consider a valid prior conviction, albeit an uncounseled one. See id. at 22.
231. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1934. Other courts recognized this need for reliability in
sentencing procedures. See, eg., United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 557 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
117 S. Ct. 77 (1996); United States v. Windle, 74 F.3d 997, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1342 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Townsend, 73 F.3d 747, 751 (7th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1544 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1449 (1996); United States v. Lee, 68 F.3d 1267, 1275 (1 lth Cir. 1995); United States v. Shrader,
56 F.3d 288,294 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Huckins, 53 F.3d 276,279 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Brown, 52 F.3d 415,425 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 754 (1996); United States
v. McMeen, 49 F.3d 225, 226 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 883 (4th Cir.
1991); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 901 P.2d 464, 467 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Aguehounde v.
District of Columbia, 666 A.2d 443, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995); State v. Viehweg, 896 P.2d 995 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1995); People v. Sanchez, 662 N.E.2d 1199, 1210 (Ill.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 392 (1996);
State v. Atkinson, 898 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); In re Registrant C.A., 666 A.2d 1375,
1377 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), cert. granted,670 A.2d 1068, and aff'd, 679 A.2d 1153 (N.J.
1996); State v. Balkin, 895 P.2d 311, 312 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wilson, 1995 WL 764989,
at *6 (Tenn. Crirm. App. Dec. 28, 1995); Beasley v. State, 902 S.W.2d 452, 463 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995) (en banc).
232. See Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1934.
233. See id.
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and will be likely to sway the judge in his or her sentencing determination.234 As a result, the dissenters were concerned that the sentencing
judge would place great importance on this unreliable conviction when
depriving a person of his or her liberty.
The dissenters argued that the ever-present concern for reliability
should prevent the use of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions in
imposing any term of imprisonment, at any time.235 Since previous
Supreme Court cases had indisputably determined that uncounseled
convictions are too unreliable to allow for imprisonment, they claimed
the Nichols majority was wrong in holding that such convictions can be
used to enhance punishment for a later offense.236 According to the
dissenters:
Under the clear rule that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction can
never justify any term of imprisonment, the judge and the parties will
know, at the beginning of a misdemeanor trial, that no imprisonment
may be imposed, directly or collaterally, based on that proceeding,
unless counsel is appointed to represent the indigent accused. 7
IV. THE NICHOLs COURT WAS WRONG TO OVERTURN BALDASAR
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Nichols was
constitutionally wrong. Moreover, the Nichols decision did not follow the
logical flow of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to Baldasar.
Rather, the holding in Nichols reflects an abrupt departure from previous
Sixth Amendment decisions and endangers the reliability of convictions
and fairness of sentencing proceedings. The Court was mistaken in
allowing judges to rely on inherently unreliable uncounseled convictions
to enhance an offender's sentence because judges traditionally may only
use reliable evidence to determine a sentence. Ultimately, in allowing the
use of prior uncounseled convictions to enhance sentencing, Nichols
unwisely opens the door for the Court to revisit Gideon v. Wainwright

234. See id. at 1934.
235. See id. at 1935-37.
236. See id. In its brief, the United States argued that "[by upholding the constitutional validity
of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions where imprisonment is not imposed, Scott necessarily
adopted the view that such convictions are reliable enough to establish the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt and to support the imposition of criminal sanctions." Respondent's Brief at 25,
Nichols (No. 92-8556). According to the government, convictions which are valid for purposes of
criminal fines and collateral civil consequences should also be valid for the purpose of punishment
enhancement. See id.
237. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1936.
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and its progeny at a later date.
A. Overturning Baldasar: A Departurefrom a Long-Standing,
Logical Progressionin the Development of the Right to Counsel
Since the Supreme Court decided Gideon, Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence has progressed in a logical fashion, step by step. In each
case, the Court saw the right to counsel as fundamental in ensuring that
the accused receive a fair trial. Linked to that concern was the Court's
steadfast commitment that no person may be deprived of his or her
liberty unless he or she has had the benefit of a fair trial with the
assistance of counsel. Baldasarwas a logical extension of Gideon and its
progeny. When the Court overruled Baldasar, it took an unwise and
dangerous step backward, leaving open an opportunity for the Court to
reexamine Gideon's Sixth Amendment foundation.
In Gideon, the Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel is fundamental in a felony prosecution and essential
to a fair trial.23 This right applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 23 9 Here, the Court took the first step in developing a basis
for its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence by concluding that an attorney is
the essential predicate to a fair criminal trial. 24° The adversarial nature
of a criminal trial is confusing and intimidating to a layperson who has
little chance of defending himself or herself against a felony charge
without the guiding hand of an attorney.24 Thus, the Sixth Amendment
promise of a fair trial requires
courts to appoint an attorney to assist
2 42
indigent felony defendants.
The Court took the next step when it decided Burgett v. Texas.243
Here, the Court determined that convictions obtained in violation of
Gideon could not be used to support guilt or enhance punishment in a
later case.2 Thus, if a court failed to provide counsel to aid an
indigent defendant in defending against a felony charge and the
defendant was convicted, that conviction could not be used in any later
proceedings. 24 Specifically, if the defendant was later charged with

238. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963).
239. See id. at 341.

240. See id. at 344.
241.

See id.

242. See id. at 344-45.
243. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
244. See id. at 114-15.
245. See id.

HeinOnline -- 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 547 1996-1997

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:507

another crime, the felony conviction obtained in violation of Gideon
could not be used to obtain a larger sentence for the defendant or to help
prove the defendant's guilt in the second trial.246
Thus, in Burgett, the Court recognized that a conviction obtained in
violation of the accused's right to counsel was tainted and its later use
was inherently prejudicial to the accused.247 In deciding this case, the
Court once again emphasized the importance of counsel to the fairness
of the proceedings against a felony defendant.248 The Court recognized
that counsel is so important that a felony conviction obtained without
24 9
counsel is virtually useless in future proceedings against that person.
By so holding, the Court implicitly determined that punishment
enhancement, where a prior crime increases a defendant's sentence for
a later offense, is equally as reprehensible as using a prior conviction to
support guilt. Thus, an uncounseled felony conviction is inherently
unreliable for any purpose.
That rationale was extended to misdemeanor convictions in
Argersinger v. Hamlin. In this case, the Court articulated the rule
that no indigent defendant can be imprisoned unless he or she has had
the assistance of counsel at trial.2"' The Court used the reasoning of
previous Sixth Amendment cases, including Gideon, to conclude that the
loss of one's liberty is so drastic that it cannot be accomplished unless
the accused has had the benefit of counsel's guiding hand.2" 2 Without
an attorney to ensure the fairness of the proceedings, the accused cannot
be subjected to the loss of liberty; one of the most important guarantees
in the Bill of Rights.253 Thus, the Court in Argersinger clearly understood that no imprisonment can be justified for a person who has not
received the assistance of counsel at his or her misdemeanor trial.
In Scott v. Illinois," the Court clarified its ruling in Argersinger
by limiting the right to counsel to those cases in which the accused was
actually imprisoned.255 The Court explained that the absolute necessity
for counsel arose only in those cases in which the defendant actually

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
See id. at 37.
See id. at 31-37.
See id. For an in-depth discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 46-63.
440 U.S. 367 (1979).
See id.
at373-74.
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received imprisonment.256 In those cases where the judge decided not
to impose a prison sentence, counsel was not absolutely necessary for the
accused.257 The Court reached this conclusion because incarceration, no
matter how long or short, is much more serious and detrimental to the
accused than a fine or the mere threat of imprisonment.2 58 In those
cases where the accused does not actually stand to lose freedom, courts
need not expend their resources to appoint counsel.2 59 The underlying
concern of this ruling was economic efficiency. 26° The Court recognized that states do not have infinite resources to appoint counsel for
every person accused of a crime which holds a potential jail sentence.26' As a result, the Court permitted states to save their resources
and required them to appoint counsel in only the more serious cases,
262
where the accused faced the actual loss of his or her liberty.
When the Court decided Baldasarv. Illinois, 263 it merely took the
next logical step in the development of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
Gideon had determined that only the assistance of an attorney can ensure
a fair trial for the accused, 264 and Burgett had decided that a conviction
obtained in violation of an accused's right to counsel is unreliable and
therefore cannot be used in future criminal proceedings to enhance
punishment or establish guilt.2 65 Scott and Argersinger had established
actual imprisonment as the litmus test, distinguishing between those who
had the right to court-appointed counsel and those who did not.2 6
In Baldasar, the Court completed the process which began with
Gideon. Focusing on the idea that any form of imprisonment without the
benefit of counsel is forbidden by the Sixth Amendment, the Court held
that the use of a previous uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to bring
about actual imprisonment in a later trial violated the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.267 The Court had already established in Burgett that

256. See id. at 373.

257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. "Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create
confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States."

Id.
261. See id.
262. See id. For a detailed discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 64-73.
263. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam).

264. See Gideon v. WVainvright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
265. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967).
266. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-74; Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37.
267. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 222-24 (per curian).
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using an uncounseled conviction to enhance punishment was virtually the
same as using it to support imprisonment initially.268 The Court in
Baldasarsaw no distinction between imprisonment for the initial offense
and imprisonment at a later date which directly resulted from the use of
the prior uncounseled conviction. 269 Either way, the uncounseled
conviction resulted in the deprivation of the accused's liberty, a result
forbidden by Gideon and its progeny.270 According to the Baldasar
Court, it was sensible to conclude that a conviction which was invalid for
bringing about imprisonment in the first instance was also invalid for
purposes of imprisonment at a later time.2 7' Since Scott and
Argersingerplaced such great importance on actual imprisonment as the
dividing line between those who have the right to counsel and those who
do not, the BaldasarCourt logically concluded that imprisonment is the
same form of punishment no matter when it occurs. 272 Thus, an
uncounseled conviction which results in imprisonment at any time
violates the accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.273
In reaching this conclusion, the BaldasarCourt reiterated the longstanding Gideon notion that a trial in which the accused does not receive
the assistance of counsel is inherently unfair and that any resulting
conviction is unreliable. 74 While the Court in Scott was willing to
accept this unfairness in certain situations because of economic
constraints, it unequivocally refused to allow unfairness of proceedings
or unreliability of convictions for the accused who actually lost his or her
liberty.275 Thus, the Scott Court grudgingly accepted the idea that an
accused may be convicted without appointed counsel so long as he or she
did not suffer the loss of his or her liberty.276 When Baldasar refused
to allow an uncounseled conviction to cause a defendant imprisonment
at any time, it upheld Scott's reasoning. Baldasar reached the logical
conclusion that if uncounseled convictions are so potentially unreliable
because of the unfairness of the proceedings, and therefore cannot result
in imprisonment initially, they will not become reliable at a later

268. See Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114-15.
269. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 222-24.

270.
271.
272.
273.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. For a detailed discussion of the Baldasaropinion, see supra Part II.B.

274.

See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).

275. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979).
276. See id.
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date.277 Baldasartook the next logical step in the Sixth Amendment
progression, finding that once a defendant is convicted without counsel,
that conviction remains unreliable and invalid to result in imprisonment
no matter when it is used against him or her.278
When the Nichols Court overturned Baldasar,it approved of a way
for prosecutors to circumvent the letter and spirit of the previous
judicially interpreted Sixth Amendment rules. Rather than preserving the
dividing line between imprisonment and other forms of punishment as
the Court did in Baldasar, the Nichols Court found a way to cross that
line. Although the loss of liberty is indisputably the same form of
punishment no matter when it occurs, the Court backtracked on the Scott
and Argersingerdecisions by concluding that the use of an uncounseled
conviction to affect actual imprisonment is sometimes acceptable and
sometimes not.279 Scott, Argersinger, and Gideon made it clear that
using an uncounseled conviction to support imprisonment is never
acceptable.28 ° Baldasar upheld this rule.281 Nichols did not. Under
Nichols, an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction can constitutionally
come back to haunt the accused by extending the duration of subsequent
imprisonment at a later date.2" The Court necessarily concluded that
a trial which is inherently unfair at an earlier stage, yielding an unreliable
conviction, somehow becomes magically fair and useful at a later date
for setting the limits of a prison term. Thus, Nichols stands at odds with
Scott, Argersinger, and Burgett, which made it clear that an unreliable
conviction remains so for all future purposes.283 Ultimately, Nichols
strikes at the heart of Gideon and creates a dangerous starting point for
those who oppose the foundation and wisdom of Gideon.
B.

Nichols Endangersthe Reliability of Sentences

The prevailing theme in these Sixth Amendment cases is the
concern for the reliability of the proceeding that yields a conviction. The
Supreme Court wanted to ensure that proceedings resulting in the loss of
an individual's liberty would be reliable and fair. In keeping with this
goal, it has long been an accepted notion that sentencing judges may use

277. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
278. See id. at 228-29.

279. See Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1927-28 (1994).
280. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-74; Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-45.
281. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 222-24 (per curiam).
282. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.

283. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-74; Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37; Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115-16.
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only reliable evidence when determining a sentence. Since Nichols allows
judges to consider uncounseled, and therefore unreliable, convictions in
fashioning a prison sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, the Court's
previous emphasis on fairness of proceedings and reliability of convictions is defeated.
1. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence Prior to Nichols:
Reliability of Proceedings as the Main Concern
From Powell v. Alabama2' through Scott, the Court recognized
the importance of counsel in ensuring the reliability of the trial proceedings. In Powell, the Court focused on the inherent disadvantages the
accused encounters when he or she stands alone in court without the
assistance of an attorney.28 Recognizing that the prompt disposition of
criminal cases is important, the Court cautioned that this goal should not
be realized at the expense of the accused's right to a sufficient and
thorough preparation of a defense.28 6 Thus, a defendant must receive
counsel who has sufficient opportunity to investigate and prepare his or
her case.287
At trial, the Powell Court noted, the accused needs counsel to
intervene to ensure that he or she does not fall victim to a bad indictment.2 88 In addition, the accused needs an attorney who has the legal
training which he or she lacks because if "[1]eft without the aid of
counsel[, the accused] may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. 289 Thus, the accused needs the guiding hand
of counsel throughout the proceedings so that he or she may establish
innocence; a task which the accused, unskilled in the workings of the
law, may find impossible to do on his or her own.290
The foregoing forceful language demonstrates the great emphasis
that the Court placed on the reliability of trial proceedings. Without the
assistance of an attorney, the defendant faces the danger of being
convicted on incompetent and inadmissible evidence. In addition, the

284. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
285. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
286. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 59.
287. See id. "'It is vain to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to prepare for
it, or to guarantee him counsel without giving the latter any opportunity to acquaint himself with the
facts or law of the case."' Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 148 A. 73, 74 (1929)).
288. See id. at 69.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 69-70; supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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defendant may be deprived of his or her liberty simply because he or she
does not know the substantive, procedural, or evidentiary rules to
establish innocence. Thus, without an attorney, the defendant may face
conviction based on completely unreliable and improper evidence.
This concern for reliability continued in Johnson v. Zerbst,zg1 in
which the Court referred to counsel as a safeguard "necessary to insure
fundamental human rights of life and liberty." 292 According to the
Johnson Court, it is obvious that the ordinary defendant will not have the
legal skill and ability to adequately defend himself or herself in a tribunal
where the prosecution is represented by trained and experienced
attorneys.293 The Court implied that a proceeding where the prosecution
is represented by an attorney, while the defendant has no counsel, is
necessarily skewed, unfair, and unreliable, as the defendant will have
virtually no chance of combating a vigorous and skilled prosecutor and
ultimately establishing his or her innocence.294 Since an uncounseled
defendant will face a complex and mysterious proceeding which provides
no chance to defend, the result necessarily will be unreliable. There will
be no means by which to ascertain whether the accused was actually
innocent, albeit unable to defend himself or herself.295 The presence of
an attorney will eliminate this unreliability.296 A defense attorney can
create order and simplicity out of the mysterious proceedings. 297 Thus,
the Court viewed an attorney's presence as an essential and necessary
ingredient to the reliability of proceedings against the accused.
The Court continued the concern for reliability in Gideon v.
Wainwright.28 In explaining the accused's need for counsel to receive
a fair and reliable trial, the Court stated that "[fjrom the very beginning,
our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the
law." 99 The Court recognized that this ideal was impossible to achieve
if the accused was forced to face these tribunals without the assistance

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id. at 462.
See id. at 462-63.
See id.
See id.; supra notes 15-27.
See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63.
See id. at 463.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 344.
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of counsel."' According to the Court, the government hiring of attorneys to prosecute cases against citizens proves the necessity of legal
assistance in the courtroom.3 ' If the government does not attempt to
secure a conviction without the benefit of a specially trained attorney, it
follows that the accused will be at a serious disadvantage if he or she
does not have the same opportunity for trained legal assistance.30 2 The
absence of legal assistance for the accused would result in an unreliable,
skewed result.
The Court once again reinforced its adherence to the reliability of
proceedings in Burgett v. Texas. 3 In this case, the Court held that a
conviction obtained in violation of the accused's right to counsel is
inherently unreliable and remains unreliable, no matter when it is
used." 4 This unreliability stays with the conviction and prevents its use
in future proceedings; the stigma, unfairness, and unreliability taint the
conviction forever."' "The admission of a prior criminal conviction
which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v.
Wainwright is inherently prejudicial ....306 Thus, the Court continued
the theme of emphasizing the importance of counsel to ensure the
reliability of the proceedings.
The importance of reliability led the Court to its conclusion in
Argersinger v. Hamlin. °7 In this case, the Court explained the need for
defense counsel, even in misdemeanor cases, where the accused faces
imprisonment.30 8 The Court justified this need by emphasizing the
necessity for reliable convictions.30 9 According to the Court, "[c]ounsel
is needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so
that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so
that he is treated fairly by the prosecution., 310 There is a special danger
of unfairness in misdemeanor cases, as the sheer volume of these cases
"may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the
fairness of the result."31 The need to move this large volume of cases
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
304. See id.at 114-15.
305. See id.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 115.
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
See id.
at 32-40.
See id.
at 36-37.
Id. at 34.

311.

Id.

HeinOnline -- 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 554 1996-1997

19961

SHAKING THE FOUNDATION OF GIDEON

through the system will create a preoccupation with speed.312 This
speed may often be substituted for careful evaluation of the defendant's
314
case. 31 3 Casual, out-of-court compromise may replace a fair trial.
"Inadequate attention tends to be given to the individual defendant,
whether in protecting his rights, sifting the facts at trial, deciding the
social risk he presents, or determining how to deal with him after
conviction. The frequent result is futility and failure. 31 5
The only way to combat this prospect for the haphazard shuffling
of citizens through the system is to ensure that they receive the assistance
of counsel.316 This will enable them to have a complete, fair, and
thorough adjudication of their cases.317 Without the assistance of
counsel, they will become "numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be
processed and sent on their way."318 Such convictions necessarily will
be unreliable since scant attention will be paid to their individual cases
and situations and the facts which may establish their innocence.319
Thus, the assistance of counsel is necessary to stop the mindless
processing of accused individuals and to ensure reliable results at trial.
In Scott v. Illinois, 320 the Court again recognized that uncounseled
convictions are inherently unreliable.3 2' However, the Court recognized
that economic concerns made it impossible to require appointed counsel
for every person in every case.3 Consequently, the Court concluded
that courts must appoint counsel for indigent defendants only in those
cases where the defendant encounters actual imprisonment.323 According to the Court, "actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from
fines or the mere threat of imprisonment."3 24 The seriousness and
severity of imprisonment make the prospect of unreliable convictions
intolerable. Thus, an accused who suffers the consequences of actual
imprisonment must have the assistance of counsel at trial.325 However,

312. See id.
at 35-36.
313. See id.
314. See id.

315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 35 (quoting FREE SOCIETY, supra note 58, at 128).
See id.
at 36-37.
See id.
Id. at 35 (quoting FREE SocIETY, supra note 58, at 128).

319. See id.at 35-36.

320.
321.
322.
323.

440 U.S. 367 (1979).
See id.
at 373-74.
See id.
at 373.
See id. at 373-74.

324. Id. at 373.

325. See id.
at 373-74.
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the Scott Court was willing to live with the reality that his or her
conviction could be obtained without the assistance of counsel if the
accused did not face the prospect of losing his or her liberty.3 26 In so
ruling, the Court did not admit to the reliability of such uncounseled
convictions, but accepted this reality in view of finite resources.
As shown by the preceding discussion, the progression of Sixth
Amendment cases has had the fairness of proceedings and reliability of
convictions as its central concern. According to the Court, reliability of
convictions is ensured by the assistance of counsel for the accused.
Without the assistance of counsel, convictions are inherently unreliable
due to the skewed nature of the proceedings and the potential for
bulldozing the accused through the criminal justice system without regard
or consideration for his or her rights. If the conviction is obtained in the
absence of counsel, the taint of unreliability remains with the conviction
forever.
2. The Court's Concern for the Reliability of Evidence Used to
Determine the Length of a Prison Sentence
According to the Nichols majority, the use of prior uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions to enhance sentencing in later proceedings is
permissible because the traditional method of sentencing is a less
exacting process than that of establishing guilt.327 For that reason,
judges may rely on evidence that has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. For example, sentencing judges may consider a
defendant's past criminal conduct, even if no conviction resulted from
that behavior.32 According to the Nichols majority, this allows judges
and the Sentencing Guidelines to rely on uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions in determining a person's sentence, since a conviction is
inherently more reliable than mere criminal behavior which does not
29
result in a conviction.
However, the fact that the sentencer may use "less exacting"
procedures to determine a sentence does not a priori make an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction reliable. When a judge relies on the
criminal behavior of the accused in formulating a sentence, the prosecutor must prove at some level that the conduct actually occurred.330 The

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See id.
See Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1927 (1994).
See id. at 1928.
See id.
See id. at 1934 (Blaclanun, J., dissenting).
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judge needs an opportunity to evaluate the circumstances and reliability
of the information presented to establish the conduct. 331 He can then
question the prosecutor and the defendant about the conduct and
determine for himself or herself whether to rely on the information in
setting the sentence.332
In contrast, if the prosecutor presents a record of a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for consideration in sentencing, the
sentencing judge does not have an opportunity to evaluate the circumstances of the conviction.333 In the prior proceeding, the accused could
have fallen victim to one of the situations discussed in Argersinger or
Gideon. The defendant could have pled guilty or been convicted merely
because he or she did not know how to establish their innocence. The
defendant could have admitted guilt simply because he or she did not
understand the proceedings, or wanted to pay a fine in order to return to
work or to his or her family. The defendant could easily have been the
subject of a case that was quickly and efficiently processed in the system
to clear the court's docket, at the expense of his or her constitutional
right and ability to establish innocence. However, a later sentencing court
does not have an opportunity to recognize these circumstances. The Court
noted that "as a practical matter, introduction of a record of conviction
generally carries greater weight than other evidence of prior con'
Thus, while a judge may question and carefully consider
duct."334
claims of the accused's prior conduct, he or she will simply see a record
of conviction and automatically take it into consideration when sentencing the defendant.33 5 Thus, the prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, which the Supreme Court has previously concluded is inherently
term; a result forbidden by the
unreliable, will lead to a longer prison
336
Scott.
and
Argersinger
Court in both
The use of prior uncounseled convictions in conjunction with the
Sentencing Guidelines is even more dangerous than the situation where

331. Seeid.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. Id.
335. See id. Although the subsequent sentencing judge arguably has the ability to inquire into
the previous conviction to determine the circumstances and reliability, this is unlikely to happen.
Even though the accused will be represented by counsel at the second trial, the facts of the first
conviction probably will not come to the surface, as the accused is unlikely to realize that he should
argue the unreliability of the prior conviction.
336. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
37 (1972).
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a sentencing judge merely considers the prior conviction with a host of
other factors. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a prior conviction
automatically places the accused in a higher criminal history category-"' Thus, the sentencing judge has little choice but to use the prior
conviction to increase the defendant's prison sentence.338 Unlike the
case where a judge can disregard a prior uncounseled conviction if he or
she deems that the circumstances make it unreliable, the Sentencing
Guidelines force the judge to give the defendant a higher sentence due
to the higher criminal history category which defines the limits of the
judicial sentencing discretion. This was the case in Nichols, where the
defendant's potential sentence increased from 168-210 months to 188-235
months.339 The Sentencing Guidelines automatically subjected the
defendant to a prison sentence twenty-five months greater than the one
he would have faced had his prior conviction not been used.3 " Although the sentencing judge could impose a longer sentence than that
dictated by the Sentencing Guidelines, they prevent him or her from
giving the defendant a lesser sentence. 341 Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines force the sentencing judge to consider an unreliable conviction, and
deny him or her an opportunity to question and examine the circumstances which led to the uncounseled adjudication.
Although a sentencing judge may consider past conduct in
determining a defendant's sentence for a subsequent offense, such
evidence does not carry the same stigma of unreliability as do prior
uncounseled convictions. Judges are unlikely to question the circum-

337. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4AI.I (1995); see also Petitioner's Brief
at 11, Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1921 (discussing the relationship between prior convictions and the
Sentencing Guidelines).
338. "If reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately
reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will

commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence departing from the otherwise
applicable guideline range." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4AI.3.
339. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.

340. See id. at 1925.
341. See Gerald w. Heaney, The Realityof GuidelinesSentencing: No End to Disparity,28 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 161, 187-88 (1991). Judge Heaney stated:
No longer is a sentence subject to reduction by the Parole Commission, and no longer
does the court retain its traditional ability to moderate the effect of the prosecutor's
decisions by ultimately controlling the sentence imposed. A district court must consider

the relevant conduct and the sentencing facts as presented to it and must impose a
sentence within a given range if the appropriate facts are established by reliable evidence.

Id. at 190; see also Melendez v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2057, 2063 (1996) (holding that a motion
by the government for departure from applicable guideline range did not authorize the court to depart
from statutory minimum sentence).
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stances behind uncounseled convictions when the prosecutor presents
them with a public record of conviction.342 In addition, the Sentencing
Guidelines prevent sentencing judges from questioning the circumstances
and reliability of prior uncounseled convictions.3 43 Thus, the use of
prior uncounseled convictions to enhance punishment endangers the
reliability of the defendant's sentence. As a direct consequence of the
prior uncounseled conviction, the defendant is deprived of his liberty to
extent; a result explicitly forbidden by Argersinger and
a greater
344
Scott.
The potential for a sentencing judge to automatically consider an
uncounseled prior conviction without inquiring about the surrounding
facts becomes even more clear when one considers how the Sentencing
Guidelines work. After conviction and before sentencing, the probation
office determines what essential sentencing facts will be included in the
sentencing report.345 In deciding which facts to use, "[p]robation offices
are compelled to rely primarily on the government files because they
have neither the human nor material resources to make an independent
investigation of the facts. 346 In addition, research shows that the
sentencing judge usually accepts the version of facts set forth in the
sentencing report and complies with the probation officer's calculation
of the sentencing range.347
Thus, since probation officers are unquestionably relying on the
prosecution's records in forming the sentencing report, and judges are
unquestionably relying on the information in the sentencing report, it is
unlikely that anyone at any stage will inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the prior uncounseled conviction. Probation officers will not
investigate, but instead will automatically use the information from the
prosecution's records. Judges will not investigate. Instead, they will
automatically use the information which the probation officers had given
them. Thus, no one will question the unreliable nature of and circum342. See Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

343. See Heaney, supra note 341, at 209.
344. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40
(1972).
345. See Heaney, supra note 341, at 172-73.
346. Id. at 168. "Clearly, in practice, the prosecutors control the ultimate judicial finding of
facts. Several probation officers believed that they had no choice but to rely on the governmentprovided facts. As one probation officer summarized, 'we basically rely on what the prosecutors and

investigators give us."' Id. at 173 (footnote omitted).
347. See id. at 174. According to one public defender, "the relationship between the court and

the probation office 'has always been [one] of trust, so the court relies very heavily on the
calculations made by the probation officer in the PSI."' Id. (alteration in original).
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stances surrounding the prior uncounseled conviction. In the end, the
conviction will automatically become a factor in increasing the
defendant's prison sentence, and no questions will be asked.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since Gideon, an accused's right to counsel has firmly been
established as fundamental and essential to a fair trial. In the absence of
a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, an uncounseled conviction
is inherently unreliable.34 8 Because of this reality, any conviction
obtained without the assistance of counsel should not be used in a
subsequent proceeding to impose or enhance imprisonment, as Baldasar
has held.349 When the Supreme Court overruled Baldasar in Nichols,
it shook the foundation of Gideon and the accused's right to counsel. It
abruptly departed from Sixth Amendment jurisprudence which had
evolved over the years and had reliability of convictions as its central
premise.35 Convictions are only reliable when the proceedings are fair,
which in turn depends on the assistance of counsel. Through Nichols,
defendants may now receive imprisonment or greater prison terms in
subsequent proceedings based on prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions, a situation at odds with Gideon. Similarly, the reliability of
such sentences is no longer stable. Accused persons can easily be
shuffled through the system now without the assistance of counsel, which
in turn may result in unfair trials and ultimately unfair sentences. In
allowing the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions without
questioning their reliability, judges are free to use inherently unreliable
evidence to fix the length of incarceration, a result without constitutional
safeguards. For these reasons, the Supreme Court was wrong and should
be encouraged to revisit the issue and reverse its position.

348. See supra Part IV.B.
349. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 222-24 (1980) (per curiam).
350. See supra Part IV.
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